International Journal of Educology

A Journal of Research, Inquiry, and Development of: (1) the Educational Process from the perspective of Educology, as Knowledge Claims about this Process, as integrated by Educative Experiences, and; (2) Educology as Knowledge Claims about the Educative Experience, as Integrated into the Educational Process, from the Perspective of Philosophy of Educology, as Knowledge Claims about this Experience.

This issue of the

*International Journal of Educology*

will be referred to as

the issue that

Belatedly Transitions

to the issue of

2013 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in *Educational Theory*

and will be designated as the

Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In *Educational Theory*

whereby

this belated and transitioning issue includes the

Volume 24, 2010 Nos. 1 and 2 Issues

combined together

involving

CD and DVD

formatted content

as accounted for in the

Special Account for The Belated and Transitioning Issues

and the

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(2) use appropriate rules of evidence to advance sound arguments in support of warranted conclusions.

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Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In Educational Theory

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Issues
Nos. 1 and 2

Special Account: The Special Account of The Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory

Recurring Editorial: The Recurring Editorial has been presented in the Nos. 1 and 2 issues since 2004 and will continue to be presented in all subsequent issues, until further notice.

Recurring Preface: The Recurring Preface will be presented in the Nos. 1 and 2 issues from 2010 and in all subsequent issues, until further notice.

The Recurring Editorial and the Recurring Preface continue the presentation of the development of the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, along with the development that has been presented in Contributing Papers in the Educology website at www.era-usa and in other issues of the International Journal Educology in both the Paperback Book format (pb-IJE) and the Compact Disc format (cd-IJE). Also, further development will be presented in the DVD formatted dvd-IJE, starting with the 2011 issues.
Special Account for The Belated and Transitioning 2010 Issues

This publication is that of a Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory. It involves the regular issues of Nos. 1 and 2 being published after the July publication date of 2010 for the No. 1 issue and the December publication date of 2010 for the No. 2 issue of the 2010 Volume 24.

The reasons for the belated and transitioning publication of these issues are entailed in the fact, as the Publisher of cd-IJE (Compact Disc formatted International Journal of Educology), having taken over the publication duties from his friend and colleague James E. Christensen, Ph.D, after Christensen founded and published the journal from 1989 to 2000, that the Publisher decided to make another change in it. Whereby:

1. the first change, made in 2002, was to publish the journal in a Compact Disc format (cd-IJE), rather than in a Soft-Back Book format (sbb-IJE);

2. the second change, made in 2003, was;
   (i) from publishing articles that were judged to be in and/or about educology for the journal that were originally papers read at AERA conventions;
   (ii) to publishing articles solicited nationally and internationally by the Publisher, and;

3. the third change, made in 2005, involved;
   (i) publishing special issues (as accounted for below), as well as regular issues, of the journal that were judged to be in and/or about educology and that were solicited by the Publisher, and;
   (ii) publishing issues of two books in and about educology that are out of print (as accounted for below);

4. the fourth change, planned for 2010, was to be the publication of cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory, however, that change will be postponed until 2012 as transitioned to;
   (i) through the publication of the issues of the Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In Educational Theory, and;
   (ii) through the publication of the 2011 and 2012 dvd-IJE (DVD formatted International Journal of Educology) series of lectures and interviews.

The publication of the issues of:

1. the Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In Educational Theory, and;

2. the 2011 and 2012 dvd-IJE series of lectures and interviews;

then follows;

3. the issues of 2009 cd-IJE’s Educology by Countries-Series I;

4. the issues of the 2008 cd-IJE’s Educology ‘86, and;
Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In Educational Theory

(5) the issues of the 2007, 2006, and 2005 cd-IJE’s Perspectives on Education as Educology;

on the way to;

(6) the 2013 cd-IJE Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory.


The issues of 2009 cd-IJE’s Educology by Countries-Series I were ones of articles that were published in the 2005, 2006, and 2007 editions, however, for the purpose of emphasizing educology internationally, they are arranged according to countries in the world, not according to how they were arranged in the book Perspectives on Education as Educology.

The issues of the 2013 cd-IJE will be that of Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses Of Articles in Educational Theory starting with the analyses of the 2009 Articles in Educational Theory. However, the Publisher made the decision to limit the analyses to only five, instead of all of the, articles in the Volume 59, Number 4, 2009 issue of Educational Theory.

The five articles are as follows.

Larry A. Hickman’s article: John Dewey at 150: Continuing Relevance for a Global Milieu;

Maura Striano’s article: Managing Educational Transformation in the Globalized World: A Deweyan Perspective;

Kathy Hytten’s article: Deweyan Democracy in a Globalized World;

Jessica Ching-Sze Wang’s article: Reconstructing Deweyan Democratic Education for a Globalizing World, and;

Kazuyo Nakamura’s article: The Significance of Dewey’s Aesthetics in Art education in the Age of Globalization.

There were two reasons for limiting the Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory, now planned for the 2013 issues of cd-IJE, to only these five articles in the Volume 59, Number 4, 2009 issues of Educational theory. They are as follows.

Reason 1: This is the reason that the Publisher of cd-IJE continues to be involved in, up to the present, and will be into the future, in respect to developing the experiential philosophy of educology as a work that can comprehensively interpret all articles in all issues of Educational Theory for the purpose, as stated in the introduction to the analysis of Maura Striano’s article, as it is now planned to appear in the 2013 issues of cd-IJE:

“From the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, the purpose of the analysis is to account for how sententially formed meanings composed in the article can be integrated by the conception of the unity of the mutually supportive funds of experiential axiologic, praxiologic, and scientific educological knowledge claims constituting the structure and function of the body of an experientially oriented educology:
(1) wherein this **body** of experientially oriented educological knowledge claims can be perceived to be **produced** through the **conduct** of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, as inquiry experiences;

(i) within the **reality** of the **existence** of the **alteration** (change, modification, adjustment, variation, amendment, revision, adaptation) of the stable and precarious traits of nature organically;

(ii) inhering in the **practice** of the educologically oriented experiential knowing process;

(2) whereby the **conduct** of this pattern of reflective thinking experiences serves as a **model** for the **conduct** of the pattern of educative experiences organically inhering in the **practice** of the educational process, and;

(3) whereby the **practice** of the educational process, as the “object” or “territory,” **intended** to be **truly referenced** axiologically, praxiologically, and scientifically in and by such a unified and mutually supportive **funded body** of experientially oriented educology involves the ten (10) inter-dependently connected features of;

(i) persons, selves, individuals, humans (commonly designated as teachers);
(ii) meeting;
(iii) to manage;
(iv) other persons, selves, individual, humans (commonly designated as students);
(v) to teach (to arrange situations that guide) them;
(vi) to study for the purpose of;
(vii) learning through conducting, i.e. through having, **educative experiences** of;
(viii) something of value (commonly designated as subjects in a curriculum);
(ix) somewhere (commonly designated as a school classroom or school) taking;
(x) some time (commonly designated as a class period or school day and year.), and;

(4) involving biotic and abiotic physical and cultural **effects** on these ten (10) inter-dependently connected features of the **practice** of the educational process.”

In short, this reason is that of the need for the Publisher to have more time to develop the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, as it is **founded** in Dewey’s experiential philosophy, for this purpose, i.e. in general, for the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of knowledge claims made about the educational process.

Reason 2: This is the reason that is afforded to the Publisher, by coincidence. Coincidently, in Volume 59, Number 4, 2009 issue of *Educational Theory* a report was made of a symposium named: A Symposium on John Dewey at 150: Relevance for a Globalized World. Larry A. Hickman was the Guest Editor of the four articles published for the symposium, and they provided interpretative material directly related to that in which experiential philosophy of educology is **founded**, i.e. Dewey’s experiential philosophy.

When analyzing the articles published for this symposium, whereby the articles themselves being **founded** in Dewey’s philosophy of experience, the Publisher became even more aware of how the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, as being **founded** in Dewey’s philosophy of experience, needed further development, even more comprehensively, by penetrating more deeply and flexibly into it.
An example of penetration into Dewey’s experiential philosophy, in which experiential philosophy of educology is founded for the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of knowledge claims made about the educational process, can be perceived in the analysis of Striano’s article. In that analysis, the Publisher came to better understand how globalization can best be conceived through Dewey’s experiential metaphysics of the reality of the existence of the alteration (change, modification, adjustment, variation, amendment, revision, adaptation) of the stable and precarious traits of nature and how his experiential metaphysics is grounded in:

1. contemporary experiential Astronomy and Cosmology and their accounts of the Big Bang origin and consequential future of the Universe;
2. contemporary experiential Ecology and its account of the inter-dependency of abiotic and biotic processes in the Universe;
3. contemporary experiential Big History and its account of past physical and social events from the Big Bang to the present, and;
4. contemporary experiential Semiotics and its account of the invention and use of meaning as conceived by Dewey and as assigned to signs in communication systems involving information and signification semiosical processes that in-form the;

contemporary experiential Logic of the conduct of inquiry experiences, i.e. the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences:

1. as it organically inheres in the practice of the knowing process, and;
2. as it serves as a model for the conduct of educative experiences;
3. as they organically inhere in the practice of the educational process;
4. as the social process it is as defined above.

Special Note: A special note should be made here, again, as it was in the 2008 issue, in regard to an earlier announced plan by the Publisher for the 2008 issue of cd-IJE to be as postponed to the 2009 issue. That plan was to begin in 2008 the 2008 cd-IJE Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory, a plan that was postponed until the year 2009, and now postponed until the year 2012, hence, it, then, was a plan to issue the cd-IJE Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory in 2009, rather than in 2008. The reason for that postponement was because of the valuation made of putting the content of the book Educology ’86 back into the public domain before the experiential philosophy of educology analyses of articles in Educational Theory begins, hence, giving the analyses a larger context of meaning, therefore, significance, as formed in literature in and about educology.

The Publisher decided to further postpone the cd-IJE Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles in Educational Theory until 2010, and now until 2013, because of the valuation made of providing a larger context of meaning, therefore significance, as formed in literature in and about educology, through the 2009 cd-IJE’s Educology by Countries-Series I, i.e. through arranging articles published in the issues of the 2007, 2006, and 2005 cd-IJE’s Perspectives on Education as Educology, by countries rather than by how they were arranged in the book Perspectives on Education as Educology.
Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In *Educational Theory*

The analyses, that are now planned for the 2013 issues of cd-IJE, will then be of the five articles in the 2009 issue of *Educational Theory* from the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology as this perspective is being developed in and through the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World. This Institute is the initiative of Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA) [www.era-usa.net](http://www.era-usa.net) and its mission is to advance philosophy of educology, as an experiential philosophical kind of inquiry guided by the questions:

   (1) “What is the body of knowledge claims about the educational process, whereby, the educational process is a social process conducted within an existing culture being conditioned and/or reconditioned by a developing democracy in the world?”

   (2) “How can this body of knowledge claims, within this kind of cultural conditioning and/or a reconditioning, be constructed and united as a body of knowledge claims about the social process of education as this kind of social process ought to have more educative experiences than mis-educative experiences conducted in it in home, school, and other community social situations in this kind of cultural conditioning and/or reconditioning?”

The year 2009, then, was the year for a Special Account of 2009 cd-IJE’s Educology by Countries-Series I, as being dedicated to publishing special issues of cd-IJE containing work in and about educology, as this work has been published in the book *Perspectives on Education as Educology*:

   (1) as arranged by the country of the author, and;

   (2) as characterized as to whether the author uses the word ‘educology’ to designate knowledge about the educational process, and the words ‘science of education’, ‘praxiology of education’, and ‘philosophy of education’ to designate kinds of knowledge about the educational process, i.e. kinds of educology.

The year 2010, then, is the year for the Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In *Educational Theory*, whereas the year 2010, in the year 2009, was to be dedicated, and now, in the year 2010, the year 2013 is to be dedicated, to the beginning of the annual publication of the special, which it is planned to become the regular, issues of cd-IJE containing analyses of articles in *Educational Theory*, from an experiential philosophy of educology perspective. As asserted earlier, the intention of these analyses is to demonstrate, over time, a way of unifying the fragmented body of knowledge claims about the educational process, i.e. unifying the fragmented body of educological knowledge claims.
As a special note, the Publisher wishes to express his appreciation to the subscribers of cd-IJE (Compact Disc formatted IJE) for their tolerance of the many changes that have been made, and are planned to be made, in the publication of the journal up to and including 2010, involving the change that will be made in the publication of dvd-IJE (DVD formatted IJE) beginning in 2011. See the Special Account for The Belated and Transitioning 2010 Issues for a listing of these changes.

Along with his appreciation of subscriber tolerance, the Publisher also solicits subscribers being understanding of the fact that he, in his retirement:

(1) while focused on developing an experiential philosophy of educology perspective, as it is founded in Dewey’s experiential philosophy, and as it contrasts with analytical and phenomenological philosophies of educology;

   (i) for the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of knowledge claims made about the educational process, i.e;

   (ii) for the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of educology;

(2) in ERA/USA’s home office, is;

   (i) being the President of Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA);

   (ii) being the Director of the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World, and;

   (iii) heading many ERA/USA initiated projects nationally and internationally, for example;

      (a) the Lithuania Project in Vilnius, Lithuania;
      (b) the Guinea Project in Conakry, Guinea;
      (c) the New Timbuktu Academy (NTA) Project in Columbia, South Carolina, USA, and;
      (d) the Chase County 7 Project in Chase County, Kansas, USA;

   (iv) performing the many operational duties involved in managing a not-for-profit corporation, as ERAUSA is;

   (v) maintaining a website at www.era-usa.net, and;

(3) at South University, Columbia (SU-C), South Carolina (SC), USA is;

   (i) teaching two sections of Introduction to Philosophy;

   (ii) coordinating the Learning Center;

   (iii) coordinating the Professional Learning Community of Faculty, and;

   (iv) assessing faculty research in SU-C institutionally oriented experiential educology.

The point is that the Publisher is “wearing many hats” while trying to realize:

(1) the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of knowledge claims made about
Belated and Transitioning 2010 cd-IJE’s Experiential Philosophy of Educology Analyses of Articles In Educational Theory

the educational process, i.e;

(2) the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of educology;

through the publication of cd-IJE and dvd-IJE, hence he is on a “steep learning curve,” whereby this “learning curve” involves the Publisher in the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences of the subject-matter referenced and made significant by the meaning of the terms ‘information technology’, ‘multi-media’ and ‘internet’. And, with a budget funded through his own social security and teacher retirement and SU-C earnings income, “hiring helpful persons,” i.e. hiring the “expertise,” who have experiential knowledge about this kind of subject-matter from their own conduct of this pattern, is not a feasible option.

So, while in this “steep learning curve;”

(1) as involving a “mode of conduct,” i.e. as involving a mode of conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences;

(2) that organically inheres in the practice of the knowing process, hence;

(3) by analogy, the mode of conduct organically inhering in the practice of the educational process,

the Publisher is in an “experimental” mode of conduct “teaching himself;” hence involving himself in the practice of the educational process in which organically inheres the conduct of educative experiences, as modeled after the practice of the knowing process in which organically inheres the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences;

(1) himself as the (i) person (ii) meeting to (iii) manage himself as a (iv) person;

(2) (v) “teaching himself” how to (vi) study and (vii) learn, i.e. to study and have educative experiences of;

(3) this kind of information technological and multi-media formed (viii) subject-matter, with its redeeming value;

(4) generally, in (ix) ERA/USA’s home office situation and in SU-C school situations;

(5) taking several months of (x) time.

Being in this steep learning curve, involving this mode of conduct of his experiences in these situations, the Publisher, then, is “learning,” i.e. is coming to know, from experience, hence, by a “pattern guided trial and error” form of conduct of his experience, and has been and will continue to be involved in making and correcting mistakes while conducting educatively (authentically learning) and mis-educatively (non-authentically learning) experiences of this kind of “subject-matter.”

So, again, the Publisher expresses his appreciation of subscriber tolerance and understanding of the many changes and errors having been made and will be made in the publication of cd-IJE and dvd-IJE, with:

(1) the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of knowledge claims made about the educational process, i.e;

(2) the purpose of providing a way for unifying the extant fragmented body of educology;
What follows is a recurring editorial in the form of a narrative outline as an introductory account of the format of the Compact Disk formatted International Journal of Educology (cd-IJE), as a journal published through the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World an initiative of Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA).

The content of cd-IJE is formatted differently, since 2005. The new format recognizes the existence of the newly forming body of knowledge, i.e. philosophy of educology, as knowledge about educology, and the existence of a developed and developing body of knowledge, i.e. educology, as knowledge about educational processes in which organically inhere features of educative experiences.

The editorial has been put into narrative outline style, with the intent of providing, as well and short as possible, at this stage, a precise and concise account of these two developing bodies of knowledge in their interrelationship to each other and other developing bodies of knowledge. The editorial is planned for recurrence and revision in future issues of the Journal, from the 2005 issue on, with no terminal date set, at this time. Comments critiquing the Recurring Editorial are solicited by the operational and contributing editors. Such comments will be included in revisions of the editorial, in respect to its change for improvement.

Issues of cd-IJE, since 2005, then, have recognized the existence of philosophy of educology and published articles in it that have been written from various perspectives, including, but not limited to, the three perspectives (analytical, experiential, and phenomenological perspectives) accounted for in the outline, as the Journal has published articles in educology from various perspectives in the past.

A Recurring Narrative Outline as an Introduction to the Journal

The International Journal of Educology (the Journal) is a refereed journal (ISSN 0818-0563) that is published biannually (January and July) by Educology Research Associates/USA (ERA/USA), through its initiative of the Institute of History and Philosophy of Educology for Developing Democracies in the World (the Institute). Periodically, special issues of the Journal are published.

When distinguishing between a word, the meaning of a word, and the reference of the meaning of a word, the meaning of the word ‘educology’ refers to a fund of knowledge claims, i.e. the fund of knowledge claims about educational processes as processes in which organically inhere a logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology of educative experiences, The word ‘educology’ derives from the words ‘education’ and ‘logy’.

‘Educology’ has been in use, in the USA, since the seminal work by the late Professor Lowery W. Harding at Ohio State University in the 1950’s. Following this seminal work was that of Professors Emeritus Elizabeth Steiner (Maccia) and George Maccia at Indiana University in the 1960’s in the USA, and, James F. Christensen and James E. Fisher from the 1970’s to the present in Australia and the USA, mostly through Educology Research Associates in Australia and the USA.

In Europe, in 1978, Professor Wolfgang Brezinka at Konstanz University, Konstanz, Germany and, in 1978-79, Professor Anon Monshouwer at the Institute of Philosophy and History of Education, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, did pioneering work in philosophy of educology. Also, in Europe pioneering work in philosophy of educology has been done by Professor Leonas Javaisa, recently retired from Vilnius University, and is being done by Professor Kestutis Pukelis at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania and Professor Lilija Duobiene at Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania, since 1991 in Lithuania, both of whom have published in cd-IJE.

In the fifty plus years since the seminal work of Professor Harding, with the meaning of the word ‘educology’ used to refer to a body of knowledge about educational processes, there has been, from the perspective of the Institute, a central challenge in philosophy of educology. It is:

The philosophical challenge of clarifying the nature of educological knowledge, i.e. clarifying the nature of
Recurring Editorial  
Version 31.4  

educology, and its subject matter of educational processes, by critiquing experiences that are conducted in  
the areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally  
organize the features of reflective thinking experiences, whereby, these experiences: (1) organically inhere  
in knowing processes; (2) are engaged for the purpose of producing knowledge about education and a  
society of reflectively experienced educologists, and; (3) constitute a model for conditionally organizing the  
features of educative experiences; (i) that organically inhere in educational processes, and; (ii) that are  
engaged in developing democracies in the world for the purpose of producing a culture of educatively  
experienced citizens.

The account that follows and the Journal, itself, from the perspective of the Institute, are intended to be an  
introduction to work in philosophy of educology, hence, philosophy, aimed at meeting this challenge.

The Journal from the Perspective of the Institute

The content of the Journal is formatted from the point of view of an experientially oriented philosophy of  
educology, a kind of empirically oriented philosophy of educology, as grounded in the empirically oriented  
philosophy of American pragmatism, and, as being developed in the Institute. The Journal publishes works  
that:

1. examine, from the perspective of educology, the subject matter that accounts for educational processes in  
which organically inhere features of educative experiences that are modeled after reflective thinking  
experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2. examine, from the perspective of philosophy of educology, the subject matter that accounts for various  
areas of interest in knowing processes that conditionally organize, i.e. that discipline, features of reflective  
thinking experiences that: (i) organically inhere in knowing processes, and; (ii) constitute a model for  
educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes.

Subject Matter for Educology

Subject matter for educology, as the territory of educology, in general:

1. is subject matter that accounts for the various and complex aspects of educational processes, in which  
organically inhere features of educative experiences modeled after the features of reflective thinking  
experiences, and;

2. is subject matter that accounts for persons, including themselves;

   2.1 in an organization of areas of interest that discipline features of educative experiences;

   2.2 of persons meeting, managing, and teaching themselves, and;

       2.2.1. other persons who authentically (well) and in-authentically (ill) study,
       2.2.2. for truly (well) and un-truly (ill) learning something,

   2.3. in some situation.

The territory of educology, then, is that which is selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. that is mapped,  
in and for educology:

1. featuring the aspects of educational processes in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled  
after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2. featuring synergetic effects in and on, and that which cause synergetic effects in and on, the aspects of  
educational processes, for example;

   2.1. the governing factors, for example, of policy and curriculum development practices, and,  
   supervisory and administrative practices as these factors have and do not have synergetic  
effects in and on educational processes in some situation, and;
2.2. the cultural factors, for example;

2.2.1. of forms of governments, economies, laws, habitus, and memes;
2.2.2. of forms of media and telecommunication networks;
2.2.3. of forms of sports and entertainment businesses;
2.2.4. of forms of industrialized science and technology business corporations, and;
2.2.5. of forms of information theory and knowledge societies;
    as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on educational
    processes in some situation and, by;

2.3. the ecosystem factors, for example;

2.3.1. of ecosystems, communities, and populations, and, of habitats and niches;
2.3.2. of bio-geo-chemical water, oxygen, and nitrogen eco-cycles, and;
2.3.3. of biotic and abiotic natural environments involving the trophic, i.e. nutritive,
    pyramids of feeding levels, food chains, and food webs;
    as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on educational
    processes in some situation.

**Educology of this Subject Matter**

As knowledge claims about the subject matter of the selectively emphasized and focused on complex of
features, i.e. the mapped features, of situated educational processes, as features in which organically inhere
educative experiences modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing
processes, educology is constituted by empirical knowledge claims, composed and asserted with warrant to
meet:

1. the descriptive and predictive challenges established in producing, for example sociology, psychology,
anthropology, and history as these funds of empirical knowledge claims are established in knowledge
societies from the educological perspective:

   1.1. not as the sociology of mapped features of educational processes, but as the educology of
       mapped features of social processes, producing sociologic educology;

   1.2. not as psychology of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped
       features of psychical processes, producing psychologic educology;

   1.3. not as anthropology of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped
       features of the cultural processes, producing anthropologic educology;

   1.4. not as a history of mapped features of past educational processes, but as educology of mapped
       features of past processes, producing historic educology, and;

2. the predictive and prescriptive challenges established in producing economics, politicology, jurisprudence,
praxiology as these funds of empirical knowledge claims are established in knowledge societies from the
educological perspective:

   2.1. not as economics of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped
       features of economic processes, producing economic educology;

   2.2. not as politicology of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped
       features of political processes, producing politico educology;

   2.3. not as jurisprudence of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped
       features of litigative and legislative processes, producing jurisprudential educology;

   2.4. not as praxiology of mapped features of educational processes, but as educology of mapped
       features of the meeting, managing, teaching, studying, and learning processes, producing
       praxiologic educology.
Educology, then:

1. is a fund of empirical knowledge claims, that provide a perspective for producing warranted descriptive and predictive assertions about social, psychical, cultural, and historical processes, such that, then, educology divides into an:

   1.1. educology of socially conducted human situated educational processes;
   1.1.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
   1.1.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what is, and could be, the case in regard to these processes;

   2.1. educology of psychically conducted human situated educational processes;
   2.1.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
   2.1.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what is, and could be, the case in regard to this process;

   2.2. educology of culturally conducted human situated process;
   2.2.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
   2.2.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what is, and could be, the case in regard to this process, and;

   2.3. educology of past humanly conducted situated process;
   2.3.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
   2.3.2. about which warranted assertions as to what was, and could be, the case in regard to this process, and;

2. is a fund of empirical knowledge claims that provide a perspective for producing warranted predictive and prescriptive assertions about economical, political, litigative and legislative, and meeting-managing-teaching-studying-learning regulated processes, such that, then, educology, further, divides into an:

   2.1. educology of effective economically conducted human situated and regulated social processes;
   2.1.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
   2.1.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social process;

   2.2. educology of effective politically conducted human situated and regulated social process;
   2.2.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
   2.2.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social processes;

   2.3. educology of effective litigatively and legislatively conducted human situated and regulated social processes;
   2.3.1. in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
   2.3.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social process, and;

   2.4. educology of an effective meeting-managing-teaching-studying-learning conducted human situated and regulated process;
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2.4.1. into in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;
2.4.2. about which is produced warranted assertions as to what could and ought to be the case in regard to these regulated social process;

Educology as Subject Matter for Philosophy

As a fund of a combination of various forms of descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive empirical knowledge claims:

1. educology has a subject matter selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, that accounts for features of situated educational processes in which organically inhere educative experiences, conducted well and ill by persons, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, conducted well and ill by persons, and;

2. educology is a subject matter selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, that accounts for features of the situated knowing processes in which organically inhere reflective thinking experiences, conducted well and ill by persons that serves as a model for educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, conducted well and ill by persons.

Whereas, then, as a fund of empirical knowledge claims, educology has a subject matter, and, it, itself, is subject matter, and, it is subject matter that compares and contrasts with that which is subject matter for it. From the perspective of educology “having subject matter,” the subject matter:

1. is that of educational processes in which organically inhere educative experiences, modeled after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and

2. is the subject matter of empirical science.

From the perspective educology “being subject matter,” the subject matter:

1. is that of knowing processes in which organically inhere reflective thinking experiences, modeling educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, and;

2. is the subject matter of empirical philosophy.

Each kind of subject matter, then, compares in that each kind selectively emphasizes and focuses on, i.e. in that each kind maps, conduct in situated processes, and, each kind of conduct, in these situated social processes, has a kind of experience organically inhering in it, whereby:

1. reflective thinking experiences organically inhere in the conduct of knowing processes and model educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, and;

2. educative experiences organically inhere in the conduct of educational processes and model after reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes.

Each kind of subject matter contrasts, however, in that:

1. educology has subject matter constituted by educational processes existing externally from itself, whereas;

2. educology, itself, is subject matter constituted by knowing processes existing internally to itself.

The subject matter of educology, as educology itself, then, is subject matter for empirically oriented philosophy, i.e. for empirical philosophy, but, not for empirically oriented science, i.e. not for empirical science. Educology, as subject matter selectively emphasized and focused upon, i.e. educology, as mapped subject matter, is that of a logically formed pattern of features of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in the knowing process. It is the logically formed pattern of the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, incorporating the logically formed patterns of “discovery” and “verification” thinking
experiences, conducted well and ill by persons obligated to conduct them as well as they can, for example, persons in knowing processes in a variety of “knowledge societies,” aka, information, information revolution, knowledge, third wave, informatization, and networks societies.

Such a variety ranges:

1. from persons obligated in scientific knowledge societies, for example:
   1.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere, as practiced in sociology, psychology, anthropology, and history, to;
   1.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in economics, politicology, jurisprudence, and praxiology;
2. from persons obligated in other scientific knowledge societies, for example:
   2.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere, as practiced in physics, chemistry, and biology, to;
   2.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in physical technology, chemical technology, and biological technology;
3. from persons obligated in “humanities” knowledge societies, for example:
   3.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere as practiced in “literature,” art, and music, to;
   3.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in theology;
4. from persons obligated in philosophical knowledge societies, for example:
   4.1. those persons obligated to meet the challenge of conditionally organizing their situated knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere, as practiced in rationalism, empiricism, logical positivism, and pragmatism, to;
   4.2. those persons obligated to meet this challenge, as practiced in existentialism.

Persons involved in knowledge societies, then, are persons obligated to meet the challenge of organizing knowing processes in which reflective thinking experiences organically inhere:

1. as practiced in the organization of conditions, i.e. in the conditional organization, of their knowledge society;
2. as determined by knowing processes in which organically inhere features of reflective thinking experiences, selected by their knowledge society for emphasis and being focused upon from the mapping of these features, and;
3. as subject matter inherent to educology as subject matter for philosophy in philosophy of educology.

**Philosophy of Educology**

Philosophy of educology, then, in general has educology:

1. as subject matter composed of knowing processes in which organically inhere features of reflective thinking experiences, hence;
2. as subject matter accounting for the process of regulating the meeting and managing of persons, including themselves;
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2.1. for the purpose of providing a conditional organization of knowing processes in which organically inhere features of reflective thinking experiences to be conducted by persons, well, i.e;

2.2. for the purpose of providing conditions for organizing the social processes involving persons meeting and managing other persons, including themselves, in which the conduct of inquiry;

2.2.1. obligates persons to authentically conduct, well, discovery thinking experiences, as involved in reflective thinking experiences in some situation, and;
2.2.2. obligates persons to truly conduct, well, verification thinking experiences, as involved in reflective thinking experiences, in some situation.

Educology, itself, then, is subject matter that is the territory of empirical philosophy, in experiential philosophy of educology, wherein, in general, it, i.e. educology, is subject matter for philosophy, whereby, then, philosophy selectively emphasizes and focuses on:

1. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2. the synergetic effects in and on, and that which causes the synergetic effects in and on, the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes in some situation, for example;

2.1. the governing factors of policy development practices, and, supervisory and administrative practices as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes, and;

2.2. the cultural factors, for example;

2.2.1. of forms of governments, economies, law, habitus, and memes;
2.2.2. of forms of media and telecommunication networks;
2.2.3. of form of sports and entertainment businesses;
2.2.4. of forms of industrialized science and technology business corporations, and;
2.2.5 of forms of information theory and knowledge societies; as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes in some situation, and, by;

2.3. the ecosystem factors of, for example;

2.3.1. of eco-systems, communities, and populations and of habitats and niches;
2.3.2. of bio-geo-chemical water, oxygen, and nitrogen eco-cycles. and;
2.3.3. of biotic and abiotic natural environments involving the trophic, i.e. nutritive, pyramids of feeding levels, food chains, and food webs;as these factors have and do not have synergetic effects in and on the conduct of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes in some situation.

Philosophy of educology, then, has logically, epistemologically, and axiologically entailed orientations in that:

1. it is axiologically oriented around the value of doing something as well as it can be done, wherein;

2. as oriented epistemologically, the doing something as well as it can be done is that of conducting knowing processes as well as they can be conducted, and;

3. as oriented logically in accord with the logic of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in knowing processes.

Implied by these entailed orientations in philosophy of educology, as axiologically, epistemologically, and logically related issues in philosophy, is philosophical educology, also, as an axiologically related issue in philosophy.
Philosophical educology, i.e. empirical philosophy of education as empirical philosophy of educational processes, is empirical axiological philosophy of educational processes as processes conditionally organized in home, school, and community educational institutions. From the axiological perspective of philosophical educology, as being developed in the Institute:

1. educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes ought to be valued by being organized to meet the conditions:

   1.1. entailed by an axiological orientation of philosophy of educology, i.e. the prescription to value doing something as well as it can be done in educational processes, as social processes conducted in home, school, and community educational institutions, and;

   1.2. entailed by an epistemological orientation of philosophy of educology, i.e. the prescription to value doing something as well as it can be done to be the prescription to value the conduct of educative experiences as they organically inhere in educational processes, i.e. social processes conducted in home, school, and community educational institutions, and;

   1.3. the prescription implied by the entailed obligation to conduct educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, i.e;

   1.3.1. the prescription to organize the conditions in which educative experiences organically inhere in educational processes conducted in home, school, and community educational institutions, to be;

   1.3.2. modeled after the value of the organization of the conditions in which the reflective thinking experiences organically inhere in knowing processes conducted in knowledge societies, and ought to be obliged to be conducted by persons inside of educational institutions, and;

2. the educational process, organized to meet the conditions prescribed in philosophical educology, as stated above, ought to be valued and selectively emphasized and focused upon, i.e. ought to be valued and mapped, as subject matter for scientific educology.

The Significance of Work Done in the Past

The account was also intended to be a sign to signify work done in the past, in and out of the Journal, and, work to be done in the future, in and out of the Journal, by scientific and philosophical educologists and philosophers of educology, in respect to these philosophical challenges in philosophy of educology.
In past issues of the Journal published from 1987 to 2003, Challenge 1, i.e. the philosophical challenge of clarifying the nature of educological knowledge and its subject matter of the educational process was attended to, however, Challenge 2, i.e. the philosophical challenge of critiquing the experience of areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences, was not attended to.

During this time, Challenge 1 was attended to primarily from an analytically oriented philosophy of educology perspective, rather than from an experientially oriented philosophy of educology perspective, both as kinds of an empirically oriented philosophy of educology perspective.

**Analytical Philosophy of Educology**

From within an analytic, rather than an experiential, philosophy of educology perspective, then, the content of the Journal was formatted with the interpretation of Kant’s first philosophy epistemologically oriented discernment between two forms of sentential meaning in language, two forms of experiences in life, two forms of non-innate knowledge in the conduct of the knowing process, and; one form of innate knowledge in the conduct of the knowing process:

1. from an early and later Wittgensteinian post modern functionally oriented epistemological perspective, in the philosophy of logical positivism, rather than;

2. from a Piercian post modern functionally oriented epistemological perspective, in the philosophy of pragmatism; wherefore, then, Kant’s first philosophy discernment of these forms, as epistemologically oriented discernments, are:

2.1. between;

2.1.1. analytic forms of sentential meaning, as meaning stated and formed in statements in language;

2.1.2. synthetic forms of sentential meaning, as meaning stated and formed in statements in language;

2.2. between;

2.2.1. a-priori forms of experience as forms outside of experiences in life;

2.2.2. a-posteriori forms of experience as forms inside of experiences in life, and;

2.3. between;

2.3.1. analytic a-priori forms of knowledge, as;

2.3.2. non-innate outside of experience;

3.3.3. truly formed analytic meanings as tautological relationships of meanings in statements in language, and;

3.3.4. synthetic a-posteriori forms of knowledge, as;

3.3.5. non-innate inside of experience;

3.3.6. truly formed synthetic meanings as non-tautological relationships of meanings in statements in language and;

3.3.7. synthetic a-priori form of knowledge, as;

3.3.8. innate outside of experience;

3.3.9. truly formed pre-dispositions to conduct the knowing process in life experiences, using language, well;

and were interpreted as discernments;

1. of functions of meaning states in the conduct of experience in the areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences of ordinary, scientific, and philosophic languages, in accord;

1.1. to how the non-innately;
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1.1. true and false analytically formed sentential meaning states, and;
1.1.2. true and false synthetically formed sentential meaning states;

1.2. in these ordinary, scientific, and philosophic languages;
   1.2.1. are comported well;
   1.2.2. into the conduct of the conjunction of the disciplines of the logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology of verification thinking experiences;
   1.2.3. as an aspect of the conjunction of these disciplines as conducted in reflective thinking experiences, and;

1.3. integrated and conducted well;
1.4. in the knowing process, rather than;

2. of functions of meaning states in the conduct of experience in the areas of interest of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology as disciplines that conditionally organize the features of reflective thinking experiences of ordinary, scientific, and philosophic languages, in accord;
   2.1. to how the non-inнатely;
       2.1.1. true and false analytically formed sentential meaning states;
       2.1.2. true and false synthetically formed sentential meaning states, and;
   2.2. to how the innately;
       2.2.1. and truly formed pre-disposition;
       2.2.2. to conduct the knowing process;
   2.3. are comported well;
   2.4. into the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;
   2.5. as conduct of;
       2.5.1. the aspect of discovery thinking experiences, and;
       2.5.2. the aspect of verification thinking experiences;
       2.5.3. as two necessary and sufficient aspects of the;
   2.6. conduct of reflective thinking experiences;
   2.7. integrated and conducted well;
   2.8 in the knowing process.

Also, from within an analytic, rather than an experiential, philosophy of educology perspective, the content of the Journal was formatted with the interpretation of:

1. Descartes’ epistemologically oriented discernment of doubt existing as a systematic rule integrated well into the knowing process conducted well, rather than of;

2. Pierce’s epistemologically oriented discernment of doubt existing as an irritable feeling, accompanying realistic imagination, interrupting urges to act, i.e. interrupting conations, as feelings of unsettlement integrated well into the knowing process conducted well, and, of;

3. Descartes’ ontologically oriented discernment of physical and mental substances.

From within an analytic, rather than an experiential, philosophy of educology perspective, the content of the Journal, then, was formatted with the interpretation of these discernments in philosophy:
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1. from only the verification thinking experiences, as conducted in reflective thinking experiences, accounted for in the post modern era philosophy of logical positivism;

2. rather than from the conduct of both:

   2.1. the aspect of discovery thinking experiences, and;
   2.2. the aspect of verification thinking experiences;

as two necessary and sufficient aspects of the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, accounted for in the post modern era philosophy of pragmatism, and, adopted in experiential philosophy of educology as being developed in the Institute.

Analytical philosophy of educology, in the past, besides providing perspective for formatting the content and publication of the Journal, it, also provided perspective for work by its co-editors, Christensen and Fisher, out of the Journal from 1987 to 2003, in that it:

1. was grounded in the work of the co-editors of the Journal, from 1987 to 2003, i.e. James E. Christensen and James E. Fisher, specifically the work that they did, out of the Journal, as co-authors of the book
Analytic Philosophy of Education as a Sub-Discipline of Educology: An Introduction to its Techniques and Application, University Press of America, Washington DC, 1979, and;

2. was used in their co-editorship of Organization and Colleges of Education: An Educological Perspective, Educology Research Associates, Sydney, Australia, 1983, wherein, an introduction is made of the account in the book of how courses and academic staff, in units in universities, the names of which contain the word ‘education’ e.g. colleges, divisions, and departments of, and, courses in education, but, better named by a name containing the word ‘educology’ e.g. colleges, divisions, and departments of, and, courses in educology, as they are in universities in Lithuania, Europe, can and ought to be organized so that conditions in knowledge society units in university educational situations include features constituting a structure that achieves logical consistency; retains flexibility; dispels ambiguity; overcomes undue pressure from traditional prejudices and interest groups; permits professional individuality and development, but excludes exploitation of the institution by the individual staff members, and; assures the integrity of the institution without stifling the creativity and responsible freedom of the professional staff members.

Analytical philosophy of educology, also, provided perspective for:

1. the below listed two important pieces of work in and out of the Journal, by Christensen:

   1.1. Perspectives on Education as Educology (edited by J.E. Christensen, Washington, D.C. University Press of America, 1981);

   1.2. Education and Human Development: A Study in Educology (J.E. Christensen, Educology Research Associates, Sydney, 1981);


   1.4. “Education for Freedom: A Philosophical Educology” (J.E. Christensen, International Journal of Educology, 6:2, 1992, 97-131);

2. the below listed two important pieces of work, in and out of the Journal, by Fisher


3. the below listed five important pieces of work in and out of the Journal, by Maccia, Brezinka, and Monshouwer:


3.3. “Meta-Theory of Education: European Contributions from an Empirical-Analytical Point of View” (Wolfgang Brezinka, Perspective on Education as Educology, Edited by James E. Christensen, 1981, 7-26)


Critique of Analytical Philosophy of Educology


This work is clearly in the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective, in which Steiner:

1. critiques, favorably, the conduct of a systematic phenomenology as the conduct of a phenomenological method, i.e. a method constituted by: “formal patterns of intuition, rules for intuitive thinking, in order to present the essence of phenomena. It is the doing of descriptive metaphysics.” (pg. 226); whereby, then, essences exist in: “the ideational realm” of consciousness. (pg. 226)

2. interprets the educational process as phenomena: “that involves subjects; subjects who are guiding the formation of consciousness of other subjects (learners) and so are teachers, and subjects (learners) who are actively participating in the formation of their consciousness and so are students. To study education, therefore, is also to study consciousness, namely the conscious formation of consciousness.” (pg. 222) And, in conclusion;

3. states: “If one follows the rules of the phenomenological method, then one can grasp essences. These essences are not relative, i.e., arbitrarily introduced by human beings through their conventions insofar as they assign meanings. Meanings are not arbitrarily assigned; there are essences to be grasped. The world which is experienced after the reduction to the pure life of consciousness is an intersubjective world, it is accessible to anyone. So the essence of education can be grasped. The metaphysics of education can be done. The essential properties of teacher, student, content, and context—the elements of the teaching-studenting process—can be set forth. A meaning basis for empirical studies of regularities can be provided. The crisis in educology can be resolved. Phenomenology is a genuine rationalism.” (pg. 227)

It is to be noted that Steiner, uses the meaning of the word ‘essence’ to refer to that which exists as ideations and that which “assigns meaning,” to be the basis of something, whereby, though, essences or ideations as forms, structures, or states are not identical to the existence of meaning, itself, whereby, then;

1. that which exists;

1.1. as a special, essential, or ideational property as a state of status that specially, essentially, or ideationally forms a state of status of something to be what it is and not to be some other special, essential, or ideational form of thing, therefore;
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1.1.1. that which exists that specially, i.e., essentially forms or states of the “pure life of consciousness;” i.e;
1.1.2. a life that, after conducting reductive thinking by following a set of “rules of intuitive thinking;”
1.1.3. is a life of being conscious of pure essences or ideations as forms that state the status of things, i.e;
1.1.4. a life of consciousness that can be “grasped,” or directly and immediately known;
1.1.4.1. by intellectual observation, but;
1.1.4.2. not by sensory observation, hence;

2. that which exists;
2.1. that determines;
2.1.1. a life of pure forms as a life purely known by persons referred to by the meaning of the word ‘subjects’ following the conduct of a set of rules for thinking in which to make intellectual observations of essences or ideations that form things,“
and;
2.1.2. a life of impure forms as a life impurely known by persons referred to by the meaning of the word ‘subjects’ following the conduct of a set of rules for thinking in which to make sensory observation of the things, but not the essences or ideations that form things, hence;
2.1.3. a life in an interactive and “intersubjective world,” that:
2.1.4. “is accessible to anyone,” and;

2.2. that provides:
2.2.1. “a meaning basis, state, or status for empirical studies of regularities,” in and for the educational process, i.e. of the regulations in and for the educational process, therefore;
2.2.2. a foundation for empirical scientific and empirical philosophic educology of this process.

In this work, Steiner critiques, unfavorably, the analytical philosophy of educology perspective, as being:

1. a limited perspective in that it is grounded in a philosophy of logic from the perspective of the philosophy of logical positivism, or as she would characterize it, from the perspective of a naturalistically oriented philosophy of science, wherein;
2. this logic, as a methodology of science, i.e. as knowledge about a method for conducting science, when integrated and conducted well in the knowing process, for producing scientific and philosophic educology, i.e. for producing scientific and philosophic knowledge about the educational process;
3. does not adequately account for the significance of the educational process, as this process; from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of educology;
4. involves persons, as subjects, conducting the conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness, as integrated well into educational phenomena, modeled after the well conduct of systematic phenomenology, integrated well into the knowing process, in that, as Steiner says: “… consciousness is not simply a cognitive state. A cognitive state cannot occur without volition and feeling. Conation is involved, because signs are always standing for somebody. An ‘I’ gives meaning; there is intentionality. Moreover, since there is self-awareness, there is feeling; there is a state of affect. Within experiencing or consciousness, we can logically sort out cognition, conation, and affect, but in any experiencing all three are together.” (pg. 224)

Steiner is making a very similar, if not identical, point that was made earlier, from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, i.e. the point that the analytical philosophy of educology perspective is limited in that:

1. its logic is that of the conduct of only verification thinking experiences, as conducted in reflective thinking experiences;
2. rather than the conduct of both:
2.1. discovery thinking experiences, and;

2.2. verification thinking experiences;

3. as two necessary aspects of the conduct of the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

4. accounted for in the post modern era philosophy of pragmatism, and;

5. adopted in experiential philosophy of educology;

6. as being developed in the Institute.

The point in common between phenomenological philosophy of educology and experiential philosophy of educology is that both logics incorporate “cognition, conation, and affect,” as well as volition and eidetic imagery, i.e. imagination, into the breadth of aspects of consciousness, whereas, however, analytical philosophy of educology incorporates only cognition into the breadth of consciousness, whereby:

1. the cognitive aspect as a logical state of consciousness;

1.1. in the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective;

1.1.1. is that aspect which constitutes the essences or ideational, i.e. the formal aspect of phenomena, that is consciously intellected, and;

1.1.2. is the logical state of status of consciousness;

1.2. in the experiential philosophy of educology perspective;

1.2.1. is that aspect which constitutes the meanings, i.e. the formal aspect of possible forms or states of conduct that is consciously intellected, and;

1.2.2. is the logical state of consciousness, and;

1.3. in the analytical philosophy of educology perspective;

1.3.1. is that aspect which constitutes the analytic a-priori knowledge, i.e. the formal aspect of tautological relationships of meanings that is consciously intellected, and;

1.3.2. is the logical state of consciousness;

1.4. all of which are integrated and conducted well in the knowing process, and;

2. the conative, affective, volitional, and imaginative aspects as psychical events in consciousness;

2.1. in the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective;

2.1.1. are the aspects that constitute the psychical events;

2.1.2. in consciousness that are sensed;

2.1.3. by internal sensory observation, and, are;

2.1.4. events in consciousness;

2.1.5. to be selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, as;

2.1.5.1. the subject matter for psychology, as knowledge about the psyche, and

2.1.5.2 the subject matter to be;

2.1.6. dissociated from;

2.1.7. the cognitive aspect, as the logical state, of consciousness by;

2.1.8. following the conduct of systematic phenomenology, as

2.1.9. well integrated and conducted;

2.1.10. in the pure knowing of essences as forms or states of phenomena feature of

2.1.11. the knowing process;

2.2. in the experiential philosophy of educology perspective;

2.2.1. are the aspects that constitute the psychical events;
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2.2.2. in consciousness that are sensed;
2.2.3. by internal sensory observation, and, are;
2.2.4. events in consciousness
2.2.5. to be selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, as
   2.2.5.1. the subject matter for psychology, as knowledge about the psyche, and
   2.2.5.2. the subject matter to be;
2.2.6. associated with;
2.2.7. the cognitive aspect, as the logical state, of consciousness by
2.2.8 following the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, as constituted by;
   2.2.8.1. the conduct of discovery thinking experiences, and;
   2.2.8.2. the conduct of verification thinking experiences, as;
2.2.9. well integrated and conducted in
2.2.10. the understanding of meanings as possible forms of states of conduct feature of
2.2.11. the knowing process, and;

2.3. in the analytical philosophy of educology perspective;
2.3.1. are the aspects that constitute the psychical events:
2.3.2. in consciousness that are sensed;
2.3.3. by internal sensory observation, and, are;
2.3.4. events in consciousness
2.3.5. to be selectively emphasized and focused on, i.e. mapped, as:
   2.3.5.1. the subject matter for psychology, as knowledge about the psyche, and
   2.3.5.2. the subject matter to be;
2.3.6. dissociated from;
2.3.7. the cognitive aspect, as the logical state, of consciousness;
2.3.8. by following only the conduct of verification thinking experiences, as
2.3.9. well integrated and conducted in
2.3.10. the analytic knowing of tautological relationships of meanings as states feature of:
2.3.11. the knowing process

This critique of the breadth of psychical aspects, as psychical events, in consciousness in analytical
philosophy of educology, as a limitation from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of
educology, correlates with a critical difference between phenomenological and experiential philosophies of
educology, and, between them and analytical philosophy of educology, as that of how the meaning of the
word ‘cognition’ is used when referencing an aspect of, i.e. a state of, not events in, consciousness involved
in logic as conducted and integrated well in the knowing process. Whereas:

1. as constituted in phenomenological philosophy of educology, the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ is used:
   1.1. to refer to the direct and immediate intellectual observation, intuition, grasping, or direct and
       immediate pure knowing;
   1.2. of the existence of “essences or ideations as actual forms of phenomena;”
   1.3. as kinds of metaphysical existents, and;
   1.4. as the “given” in the logical state of, not psychical events in, consciousness, that;
   1.5. “assigns” meaning states, that;
   1.6. “comports” significant conduct in;
   1.7. the conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness;
   1.8. constituted in the conduct of systematic phenomenology;
   1.9. as integrated and conducted well;
   1.10. in the knowing process;
2. as constituted in experiential philosophy of educology, the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ is used:
2.1. to refer to the direct and immediate intellectual observation, intuition, grasping, or direct and immediate understanding;

2.2. of the existence of “meaning states as possible forms of conduct;”

2.3. as kinds of special conduct, and;

2.4. as the “given” in the logical state of, not psychical events in, consciousness, that;

2.5. “comports” significant conduct in;

2.6. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

2.7. constituted by the conjugation of;

2.7.1. the conduct of discovery thinking experiences, and;

2.7.2. the conduct of verification thinking experiences;

2.8. as integrated and conducted well;

2.9. in the knowing process, and;

3. as constituted in analytical philosophy of educology, the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ is used:

3.1. to refer to the direct and immediate intellectual observation, intuition, grasping, or direct and immediate analytic knowing;

3.2. of the existence of “tautological relationships of meanings as states of actual physical forms of referents;”

3.3. as the only kinds of referents that can be verified;

3.4. as the “given” in the logical state of, not psychical events in the consciousness of verification thinking experiences, that;

3.5. “comports” significant conduct in;

3.6. the conduct of sensory experience;

3.7. the conduct of symbolic logic;

3.8. as integrated and conducted well;

3.9. in the knowing process.

The fundamental difference, then, between phenomenological, experiential, and analytical philosophies of educology is that of the difference in the use of the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ to refer to cognition:

1. as a logical state of, not as a psychical event in, pure knowing of essences as forms of phenomena;

2. as a logical state of, not as a psychical event in, understanding of meanings as possible forms of conduct, and;

3. as a logical state of, not as a psychical event in, analytic knowing of tautological relationships of meanings as actual forms of physical referents, as these relationships between meanings are integrated into the conduct of the conjunction of the logic and psychology of the knowing process.

With this discernment between the logical state of consciousness, intellectually observed, and psychical events in consciousness, internally sensorily observed:

1. in phenomenological philosophy of educology’s logic, the meaning of the word ‘cognitive’ implies the direct and immediate “pure knowing” of essences as actual forms or states of things being well integrated and
conducted in the knowing process;

2. in experiential philosophy of educology’s logic, the meaning of the word ‘cognitive’ implies the direct and immediate “understanding” of meanings as possible forms or states of conduct being well integrated and conducted in the knowing process, and;

3. in analytical philosophy of educology’s logic, the meaning of the word ‘cognitive’ implies the direct and immediate “analytic knowing” of tautological relationships of meanings as actual forms or states of physical referents being well integrated and conducted in the knowing process.

Using the meaning of the word ‘cognition’, in the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of educology, the knowing process, as the well conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness is well integrated into it, is such that, if followed well, then;

1. pure states, i.e. essences or ideations as actual forms or states of things can be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately known, as they exist as cognitive states, i.e. logical states of pure consciousness of subjects, in so far as, however;

2. impure events, i.e. imagination of psychic images, emotion of psychic feelings, volition of psychic determination to move, and, conation of psychic urges to move, that exist as psychical events in the consciousness of subjects are:

   2.1. selectively emphasized and focused on so as;
   2.2. to disassociate them, by excluding them, from being focused on;
       2.2.1. so that the pure states of, i.e. the essences as forms of, things;
       2.2.2. in the consciousness of subjects;
   2.3. can be selectively emphasized and focused on;
       2.3.1. to be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly, immediately, and purely known;
       2.3.2. so as to assign states of meaning, not events of imagery and/or feelings;
       2.3.3. to be well integrated;
   2.4. into the knowing process conducted well, therefore;
       2.4.1. providing a logical state for;
       2.4.2. internally and externally oriented sensory observations;
       2.4.3. in verification thinking experiences.

Using the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ from the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology, the knowing process, as the well conduct of discovery and verification thinking experiences, in the reflective thinking experience, is well integrated into it, is such that, if followed well, then;

1. as possible forms of conduct, states of meanings can be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately understood, as they exist in the cognitive, i.e. logical, state of consciousness of subjects, in so far as;

2. imagination, emotion, volition, and conation as psychical events in the consciousness of subjects exist in association with possible forms of conduct as meaning states existing as the cognitive, i.e. logical, state or status of consciousness of subjects, whereby, the psychical events are:

   2.1. selectively emphasized and focused on so as;
       2.1.1. to associate them, by including them, with;
       2.1.2. possible forms of conduct, as states of meanings;
       2.1.3. in the logical state of consciousness of subjects;
       2.1.4. so that states of meanings as plausible forms of conduct:
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2.2. can be selectively emphasized and focused on;
   2.2.1. to be grasped, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately understood;
   2.2.2. so that meaningful conduct becomes integrated well;

2.3. into the knowing process conducted well, therefore;
   2.3.1. providing a logical state for;
   2.3.2. sensory observations, in;
   2.3.3. discovery thinking experiences, and, in;
   2.3.4. verification thinking experiences, in:

2.4. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences.

Using the meaning of the word ‘cognition’ from the perspective of analytical philosophy of educology, the knowing process, as the conduct of only verification thinking experiences, is such that, if followed well, then;

1. meanings as actual forms or logical states for referencing only physical referents can be grasp, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately analytically known, as they condition the consciousness of subjects, in so far as;

2. imagination, emotion, conation, and volition as psychical events in consciousness exist in disassociation with meanings as possible forms or states of conduct in verification thinking experiences of subjects, whereby, the psychical events in consciousness are:
   2.1. selectively emphasized and focused on so as;
      2.1.1. to disassociate, by excluding them, from;
      2.1.2. meanings as actual forms or states for only referencing;
      2.1.3. physical events and objects;
      2.1.4. in verification of thinking experiences;
   2.2. so that meanings, also, as plausible forms or states of conduct:
      2.2.1. can be selectively emphasized and focused on;
      2.2.2. to be grasped, intuited, intellectually observed, i.e. directly and immediately; analytically known as tautological relationships of meanings;
      2.2.3. for meaningful conduct becoming integrated well;

2.3. into the knowing process conducted well, therefore;
2.4. providing a logical state for;
2.5. sensory observations, in;
2.6. the conduct of verification thinking experiences.

Critique of Analytical and Phenomenological Philosophies of Educology

From the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology, then, both analytical and phenomenological philosophies of educology are critiqued, unfavorably, hence, are limited in that they both disassociate, by excluding, psychical events in consciousness from the logical state of consciousness, in the knowing process, though in different ways, whereas, however, experiential philosophy of educology, associates, by including, them in consciousness in the knowing process, in that:

1. Phenomenological philosophy of educology does the dissociation:
   1.1. directly through its rules of reduction, constituting;
1.2. the conduct of systematic phenomenology;

1.3. involving eidetic reduction, i.e.

1.4. dissociating, by excluding;

   1.4.1. imagery in imagination, feelings in emotion, urges to move in conation, and determination to move in volition;
   1.4.2. as psychical events in consciousness, and;
   1.4.3. sensorily observed;
   1.4.4. by internally oriented sensory observation, and;

1.4. dissociating, by excluding;

   1.4.1. physical events external to consciousness;
   1.4.2. as sensorily observed;
   1.4.3. by internally oriented sensory observation, and;

1.5. associating, by including;

1.6. intellectual observations of essences, i.e. of ideations,

1.7. as purely knowing, i.e. purely cognizing;

1.8. the logical states of consciousness;

1.9. as actual forms of phenomenon;

1.10. as integrated and conducted well;

1.11. in the knowing process, and;

2. Analytical philosophy of educology does the dissociation:

2.1. indirectly through its rules of reduction, constituting;

2.2. the conduct of symbolic logic;

2.3. involving declaratively formed sentences functioning as statements, i.e;

2.4. involving sententially formed meanings, as logically formed cognitive states, in;

2.5. ordinary, scientific, and philosophical languages;

   2.5.1. being reduced to atomic, or, protocol sententially formed meaning states;
   2.5.2. referring to, and only to;
   2.5.3. physical event and objects
   2.5.4. external to consciousness;
   2.5.5. sensorily observed;
   2.5.6. by externally oriented sensory observation;

2.6. dissociating, by excluding, psychical events;

   2.6.1. in consciousness;
   2.6.2. sensorily observed;
   2.6.3. by internally oriented sensory observation, but;

2.7. associating, by including, the logical state;

   2.7.1. of analytic knowing, i.e. analytic cognizing;
   2.7.2. tautological relationships of meanings;
   2.7.3. intellectually observed;
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2.7.4. as actual forms of physical events and objects, and;

2.8. associating, by including, physical events and objects;
   2.8.1. sensorily observed;
   2.8.2. by externally oriented sensory observation;

2.9. as integrated and conducted well;

2.10. in the knowing process, and;

3. Experiential philosophy of educology does the association:
   3.1. directly through its principle of eduction, involved in;
   3.2. the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, constituted by;
      3.2.1. the conduct of discovery thinking experiences, and;
      3.2.2. the conduct of verification thinking experiences;
   3.3. involving declaratively formed sentences functioning as statements, i.e;
   3.4. involving sententially formed meanings states in;
   3.5. ordinary, scientific, and philosophical languages;
      3.5.1. being educted for;
      3.5.2. referring to, but, not only to;
      3.5.3. physical events and objects, hence;
   3.6. associating, by including, psychical events;
      3.6.1. internal to consciousness;
      3.6.2. sensorily observed;
      3.6.3. by internally oriented sensory observation, and;
   3.7. associating, by including, physical aspects;
      3.7.1. external to consciousness;
      3.7.2. sensorily observed;
      3.7.3. by externally oriented sensory observation, and;
   3.8. associating, by including, logical states;
      3.8.1. of understanding meanings;
      3.8.2. as forms or states of possible conduct
      3.8.3. intellectually observed;
      3.8.4. internal to consciousness;

3.9. as integrated and conducted well;

3.10. in the knowing process.

Outcome of Critique

From the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology, the main outcome of the critique is that the analytical philosophy of educology and phenomenological philosophy of educology perspectives are shown to be limited in that they disassociate, by excluding, the psychical aspects, i.e. psychical events, from the logical aspect, i.e. logical state, in consciousness by the conduct they purport to integrate and conduct well,
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hence, providing an inappropriate model for conduct to be well integrated into the educational process, whereby:

1. from the analytical philosophy of educology perspective it is conduct of verification thinking experiences;
   1.1 involving the conduct of reduction;
   1.2. by following the rules of symbolic logic, and;
2. from the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective it is the conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness;
   2.1. involving the conduct of reduction;
   2.2. by following the rules of systematic phenomenology, and; in contrast;
3. from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective it is the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;
   3.1. involving the conduct of eduction;
   3.2. by following the principles of;
      3.2.1. discovery thinking experiences, in conjunction with;
      3.3.1. verification thinking experiences.

The Significance of Work to be Done in the Future

From the perspective of the Institute, the work to be done in the future in philosophy of educology, as stated earlier, is that of meeting two challenges, i.e:

Challenge 1: the philosophical challenge of clarifying the nature of educological knowledge, i.e. of educology and its subject matter of the educational process, and;

Challenge 2: the philosophical challenge of critiquing the conduct of reflective thinking experiences;

2.1. as the conduct that integrates, well, the organization of conditions in which the knowing process is conducted, hence, the logic that when conducted well produces the body of educological knowledge, and, also that produces all other bodies of knowledge, and;

2.2. as the conduct of reflective thinking experiences, functioning as a model for the conduct of educative experiences, ought to be better integrated into the organization of conditions in which the educational process is conducted.

The significance of this future work, from the perspective of the Institute:

1. will be to continue to show the limitations of the analytical and phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective being connected to their logics and psychologies of reduction, as;

   1.1. the psychical aspects, in conscious reflective thinking experiences, being disassociated, by exclusion, from the logical aspect, of conscious reflective thinking experiences, then;

   1.2. disassociating, by excluding, hence, preventing:
      1.2.1. the imaginative, emotional, conative, and volitional aspects involved in discovery thinking experiences, from being conjoined with;
      1.2.2. cognitive thinking experiences involved in verification thinking experiences, and, in the conscious formation of conscious thinking experiences, in;
      1.2.3. reflective thinking experiences;
      1.2.4. being conducted and integrated well, into;
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1.2.5. the knowing process, therefore;

2. will be to continue to show the frontiers of the experiential philosophy of educology and its conduct of
eduction, as;

2.1. associating, by including, hence, developing;

2.1.1. the imaginative, emotional, conative, and volitional aspects, as the psychical
aspects of conscious discovery thinking experiences, being conjoined with;

2.1.2. cognitive thinking experiences, as the logical aspect of conscious formation of
conscious, and, verification thinking experiences, as

2.1.3. two necessary stages of reflective thinking experiences;

2.1.4. being conducted and integrated well, into;

2.1.5. the knowing process, therefore,

2.2. being a model for educative experiences;

2.2.1. being conducted and integrated well, into;

2.2.2. the educational process.

The significance of future work in experiential philosophy of educology, in meeting its two challenges,
then, is that it will provide a body of knowledge for a profession, as referred to by the meanings, for
example, of such words as ‘the profession of teaching’, ‘the profession of school teachers’, ‘the profession
of school administrators’, ‘the profession of school counselors’; and, could and should be referred to by the
meaning of the words ‘the profession of educologists’.

The significance of further work, then, will be that of providing for the profession of educologists to have a
body of knowledge which can and will provide perspective and confidence so that “the profession” can and
will have the kind of political influence it needs to arrange for the organization of conditions in which
educative experiences are well integrated and conducted in the educational process of educational
institutions, e.g. home, school, and community educational institutions, as modeled after reflective thinking
experiences being well integrated and conducted in the knowing process.

Notes

begins, then, in the Recurring Editorial in the No. 2, Vol. 29, 2005 issue of cd-IJE. Version 2 is a modification of
Version 1 in that the statement on Page I, that: “Also, in Europe pioneering work in educology has been, and is being
done, by Professor Kestutis Pukelis at Vytautas Magnus University since 1991 in Lithuania.”
has been modified to state that: “Also, in Europe pioneering work in educology has been done by Professor Leonas
Jovaisa, recently retired from Vilnius University, and is being done by Professor Kestutis Pukelis at Vytautas Magnus
University, Kaunas, Lithuania and Professor Lilija Duobliene at Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania, since 1991 in
Lithuania.” Therefore, Version 2 includes Professors Jovaisa and Duobliene, along with Professor Pukelis, as doing
pioneering work in educology in Lithuania.

1.2. In the 2005 Vol. 19 African Special Issue the above two statements are modified, by the following statement:
“Also, in Europe, before the 1991 Lithuanian Revolution, pioneering work in and about educology was done
by Professor LEONAS JOVAISA. Professor Jovaisa suggested using the new term ‘educology’ and argued
that when the limits of some scientific term are overstepped we need a new term, hence, because the limits of
pedagogy have been overstepped by being considered to be applied psychology, the new term ‘educology’ is
needed. Professors Pukelis and Duoblíene, then, have continued to use and extend the term ‘educology’ since the

1.3. Version 4 is a modification of Version 3 and is one made beginning in the 2006 issues of cd-IJE. This
modification is from the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology to be, generally, that of considering
the experience of the conduct of the interests of logic, psychology, problematics, and methodology, rather than just logic
and psychology, as the experience of the conduct of disciplines constituting educology.
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Part 0
Dewey’s Experiential Philosophy of Pragmatism in Which is Founded an Experiential Philosophy of Educology Perspective

In Part 1 of the Recurring Preface the purpose of the analyses of articles in Educational Theory is stated from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective. In Part 0 the founding of this perspective is accounted for beginning with a critique made in the Recurring Editorial of cd-IJE. The outcome of that critique, in which the experiential philosophy of educology is compared and contrasted with analytical and phenomenological philosophies of educology, is quoted below.

“Outcome of Critique

From the perspective of experiential philosophy of educology, the main outcome of the critique is that the analytical philosophy of educology and phenomenological philosophy of educology perspectives are shown to be limited in that they disassociate, by excluding, the psychical aspects, i.e. psychical [mental] events, from the logical [the semiotics of the semiosical process] aspect, i.e. logical [the semiotics of the semiosical process] state, in consciousness by the conduct they purport to integrate and conduct well, hence providing an inappropriate model for conduct to be well integrated into the educational process, whereby;

1. from the analytical philosophy of educology perspective it is [the inappropriate model of the] conduct of verification thinking experiences;
   1.1 involving the conduct of reduction;
   1.2. by following the rules of symbolic logic, and;

2. from the phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective it is [the inappropriate model of the] conduct of the conscious formation of consciousness;
   2.1. involving the conduct of reduction;
   2.2. by following the rules of systematic phenomenology, and; in contrast;

3. from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective it is [the appropriate model of the] conduct of reflective thinking experiences;
   3.1. involving the conduct of eduction;
   3.2. by following the principles of;
   3.2.1. discovery thinking experiences, in conjunction with;
   3.3.1. verification thinking experiences.” (Recurring Editorial cd-IJE, pgs. XXI-XXII)

Leaving:

(1) the semiosical existence of the meanings of the locutions;
   (i) ‘conduct of verification thinking experiences’;
   (ii) ‘conduct of reduction’, and;
   (iii) ‘rules of symbolic logic’, and their relation to the semiosical existence of the meaning of the locution;
   (iv) ‘analytical philosophy of educology perspective’;

(2) the semiosical existence of the meanings of the locutions;
   (i) ‘conduct of conscious formation of consciousness’;
   (ii) ‘conduct of reduction’, and;
   (iii) ‘rules of systematic phenomenology, and their relation to the semiosical existence of the meaning of the locution;
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(iv) ‘phenomenological philosophy of educology perspective’, and;

(3) the semiosical existence of the meanings of the locutions;

(i) ‘conduct of reflective thinking experiences’;
(ii) ‘conduct of eduction’;
(iii) ‘principles of discovery thinking experiences’;
(iv) ‘principles of verification thinking experiences’, and their relation to the semiosical existence of the meaning of the locution;
(v) ‘experiential philosophy of educology perspective’;

as accounted for in the Recurring Editorial of the cd IJE, an epistemologically determined summary of the outcome of the critique is that the experiential, analytical, and phenomenological philosophies of educology:

(1) compare in that each has an epistemological perspective on what knowledge is, generally, and about what knowledge about the educational process is, i.e. about what educology is, specifically, whereas they;

(2) contrast in that each has a different epistemological perspective as to what this knowledge, generally and specifically, is, hence they;

(3) contrast in that each has a different perspective as to what an appropriate model for conduct to be well integrated into the educational process is.

The meaning of the locution:

(1) ‘an appropriate model for conduct to be well integrated into the educational process’, as used above;

as well as the meaning of the locution;

(2) ‘what the meaning of the word, term, or locution X refers to and makes significant, hence, represents’ as used hence forth;

will be left for a later part in this Recurring Preface.

The analyses of articles in Educational Theory is from the perspective that experiential philosophy of educology provides the best, hence the most appropriate, model for conduct to be well integrated into the educational process.

Entailed in the experiential philosophy of educology perspective is a naturalistically determined experiential ontology, whereby this ontology is founded in Dewey’s naturalistically determined experiential philosophy of pragmatism.

Sub-Part 0.1
A Naturalistically Determined Experiential Ontology
Existing and Functioning Implicitly in Dewey’s Naturalistically Determined Experiential Philosophy of Pragmatism

This naturalistically determined experiential ontology was conceived (mind experienced) and developed by the publisher of cd-IJE to be perceived to be implicitly existing and functioning in Dewey’s naturalistically determined experiential philosophy of pragmatism as a philosophy formed through the traditional “dimensions of philosophy,” i.e. through an experiential ontology, experiential metaphysics, experiential logic, experiential epistemology, experiential ethics, experiential aesthetics, experiential axiology, and experiential politicology, as:

(1) using an outline type narrative style of composition involving the repetition of the meanings of the locutions;

(i) ‘conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims about’;
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(ii) ‘intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought,’ and;

(iii) ‘reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe’, along with;

(2) continuing the bold fonting of selected terms and locutions.

These dimensions of philosophy thusly conceived (mind experienced), then are that:

(1) experiential ontology is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing what exists and how what exists is experienced to be known in, through, and by the intra- (within selves, inter- (between selves), and trans- (across to, amongst, and with selves) active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself is organically inherent in the knowing (inquiry) process practiced in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe;

(2) experiential metaphysics is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing what reality is as the change or alteration of the nature of the universe and about how reality is experienced to be known in, through, and by the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself is organically inherent in the knowing (inquiry) process practiced in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe;

(3) experiential epistemology is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing what is experienced to be known to be true as an organic consequence (outcome, product) of the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself is organically inherent in the knowing (inquiry) process practiced in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe;

(4) experiential logic is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing how what exists that is experiencable for being known in and by the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself is organically inherent in the knowing (inquiry) process practiced in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe;

(5) experiential aesthetics is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing what is experienced to be known to be true and beautiful as an organic consequence (outcome, product) of the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself is organically inherent in the knowing (inquiry) process practiced in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe;

(6) experiential ethics is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing what is experienced to be known to be true, beautiful, and good as an organic consequence (outcome, product) of the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself is organically inherent in the knowing (inquiry) process practiced in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe;

(7) experiential axiology is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing what is experienced to be known to be the value of the true, beautiful, and good in, through, and by the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself is organically inherent in the knowing (inquiry) process practiced in the reality of the union of two.
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general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, and;

(8) experiential politicology is conceived (mind experienced) to be constituted of experiential philosophical knowledge claims representing how to organize and govern people in adherence with experiential ontology, metaphysics, logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and axiology, in which is founded an experiential philosophy of educology.

An exposition of the conception (minding) of experiential ontology was presented in a paper read at a Torch Club meeting in Columbia, South Carolina in 2006, whereas the Torch Club is an international association in which respected community members practicing recognized professions enjoy the civil interchange of knowledge. The publisher of cd-IJE read the paper, being recognized as a community member practicing the profession of philosophy of educology. The paper is published as Contributing Paper 2.2 at www.era-usa.net.

Selectively summarized, here, will be that experiential ontology, thusly naturalistically determined, using an outline type of narration composition style involving the use of bold fonting, accounts for:

(1) the dispositional existence of acquired and non-innate socially and culturally induced habits and of non-acquired and innate genetically determined propensities as being human mind (conceptually) experiencable by inference, in organic association with;

(2) the semiosical existence of meaning being human mind (conceptually) experiencable by implication, in organic association with;

(3) the mental existence of mental images, mental feelings, mental urges to move and/or to not move, and mental determinations to move and/or to not move, being human psyche (perceptually) experiencable, respectively, by imagination, by emotion, by conation, and by volition, in organic association with;

(4) the physical existence of;

(i) the exceptionally large (the physical universe and its structure, function, origin, and future);

(ii) the very large (continents, mountains, valleys, forests, cities, etc. included in the physical existence of the exceptional large);

(iii) the moderately large (trees, cars, houses, etc. included in the physical existence of the very large);

(iv) the moderately small (sand pebbles, dust particles, amoebas, etc.);

(v) the very small (molecules, genes, chromosomes, etc. included in the physical existence of the moderately small), and;

(vi) the exceptionally small (quarks, electrons, neutrons, protons, etc included in the physical existence of the very small)

being human brain-sensory (perceptually) experiencable by the exterio-ceptor determined brain-sensory experience of the sensception of physical existence, in organic association with;

(5) the physiological existence of the dis-comfort of the unsettlement of the human body feelings of pain and the comfort of the settlement of the human body feelings of pleasure, as well as the human body urges and determinations to move and/or not to move, being human brain-sensory experiencable by the interio-ceptor determined human brain-sensory (perceptual) experience of the kinception of physiological existence, whereby;

(6) these human mind (conceptual), psyche (perceptual) and brain-sensory (perceptual) kinds of possible experiences, respectively of dispositional, semiosical, mental, physical, and physiological inter-connected and inter-dependent forms of existence;

(7) organically inhere and function in the operations involved in the intra- (within selves), inter- (between selves), and trans- (across to, with, and among selves) active;

(8) conduct of the pattern of phases of reflexive (self-mentioning) and reflective (self- and other-selves-mentioning) thinking (inquiry) experiences;

(9) aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, of which the potential to actualize itself organically inhere in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process;
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(10) in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe.

Sub-Sub-Part 0.1.1
Dewey’s Conception (Mind Experience) of the Existence, Transformation, and Function of Material, Subject-Matter, Objects, and Content of Propositions as Transitional Features Involved in the Intra-, Inter-, and Trans-Active Conduct of the Pattern of Phases of Reflective Thinking Experiences Organically Inherent in the Practice of the Knowing (Inquiry) Process in the Reality of the Union of the Change or Alteration of Two General Contingent Traits of the Nature of the Universe

Continuing with the outline narrative style of composition by using bold fonting, one function the experiential ontology implicitly performs in Dewey’s naturalistically determined experiential philosophy of pragmatism is conceived (mind experienced) to assist in an account of Dewey’s conception of the transitional features of material, subject-matter, object, and content of propositions in the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences organically inherent in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, is that of:

(1) material, as that which physically, physiologically, mentally, dispositionally, and semiosically exists and is experienced, respectively, by human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences, and as that which is selected to be inquired into by the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed, at, in and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering as the potential to actualize itself, in the practice of the experiential knowing (inquiry) process, therefore material becoming transformed into subject-matter, in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, whereby;

(2) subject-matter, as that which exists and is being inquired with, by the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, as the conduct of a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering, as the potential to actualize itself, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process, therefore subject-matter becoming transformed into an object, in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, whereby;

(3) an object is that which exits as the transformed, hence mediated outcome (hence, mediated product, mediated consequence) in and of the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of experiential inquiry (practice of the experiential knowing process) in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) traits (the precarious and stable traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, and is the object which is formed for representation in and by;

(4) the content of propositions;

(i) used in reason to reference and make significant the existence of material being transformed into subject-matter, and subject-matter being transformed into objects, and;

(ii) used to guide the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, as potential to actualize itself, organically inhering in;

(iii) the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process;

(5) as composed to semiosically exist in sententially formed meanings;

(6) in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe.

The conceptions (mind experiences) of the transitional features of material being transformed into subject-matter; subject-matter being transformed into objects, and; objects being referenced and made significant, hence being represented, by the content of propositions, formed in and by sententially composed meanings, involved in

“Were it not that knowledge is related to inquiry [to the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought (bold fonting by publisher of cd-IJE), in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process] as a [mediated] product of the operations [involved in this intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct and practice] by which it [knowledge] is produced, no distinctions requiring special differentiating designations would exist. Material would merely be a matter of [immediate] knowledge [in contrast to immediate understanding] or of [immediate] ignorance and error [in contrast to immediate mis- or incomplete-understanding]; that would be all that could be said. The content of any given proposition [the content of any given declaratively determined sentential composition of meanings mind (conceptually) experiencable by implication] would have the values "true" and "false" as final and exclusive [immediately known, in contrast to immediate understanding] attributes. But if knowledge is related to inquiry [to the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process] as its warrantably assertible [as a knowledge claim mediated product, and if inquiry [if the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in, and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process] is progressive and temporal, then the material inquired into [the physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical material and, respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences, involved in the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences in a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process], reveals distinctive properties which need to be designated by distinctive names. As undergoing inquiry, [as undergoing the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at, in and by a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process] the material [as being mediated] has a different logical import from that which it has as the [mediated] outcome of inquiry [mediated outcome of the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences involved in a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process]. In its [in material’s] first capacity and status, it [the material] will be called by the general name subject-matter. When it is necessary to refer to subject-matter in the context of either observation or ideation [of being brain-sensory (perceptually) and/or psyche (perceptually) experiencable by “observation,” respectively, through sensceptual, konceptual, imaginational, emotional, conational, and volitional experiences, or of being mind (conceptually) experiencable by “ideation” through implication], the name content will be used, and, particularly on account of its representative character, content of propositions [content of declaratively determined sentential composition of the semiosical existence of meanings mind (conceptually) experiencable by implication].

The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been [mediated,] produced and ordered in settled form by means of inquiry [by means of the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involved in a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process]; proleptically, [mediated] objects are the [mediated] objectives of inquiry [mediated objectives of the intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involved in a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process]. The apparent ambiguity of using "objects" for this purpose (since the word is regularly applied to things that are observed [sensory or psyche (perceptually) experienced] or thought of [mind (conceptually) experienced] is only apparent. For things [physical, physiological, and mental things as events and semiosical and dispositional things as states] exist as [mediated] objects for us only as they have been previously determined as outcomes of inquiries [outcomes of the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process]. When used in carrying on new inquiries [new intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process] in new problematic situations, they are [immediately] known [also as being immediately understood] as objects in virtue of prior inquiries [prior intra-,inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process] which warrant their assertibility [in conduct]. In the new situation, they are means of attaining [mediated] knowledge of something else. In the strict sense, they are part of the contents of inquiry [of the
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intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process as the word content was defined above. When it is necessary to refer to subject-matter in the context of either observation or ideation [of being either sensory and psyche (perceptually) experiencible by “observation,” or of being mind (conceptually) experiencible by “ideation”], the name content will be used, and, particularly on account of its representative character, content of propositions [content of declaratively determined sentential composition of meanings mind (conceptually) experienced by implication]. But retrospectively (that is, as [mediated] products of prior determination in inquiry [prior intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing, i.e. inquiry, process]) they are objects.” [Page lw.12.122]

In summary, in the above quote, stylistically for emphasis, by using repetition, bold fonting, and bracketing, from the perspective of the experiential ontology of the transitional features of material transformed into subject-matter; subject-matter transformed into objects, and; objects referenced and made significant by the content of propositions, formed in and by sententionally composed meanings, in the practice of the knowing process:

(1) inquiry has been conceived (mind experienced) as the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, existing potentially for actualization and in organically inhering in the practice of the knowing process in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, and;

(2) the material inquired into (the material thought representing, the material reflected on) in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of reflective experiences aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, existing potentially for actualization, by this thusly conducted practice of the knowing process, has been conceived (mind experienced) as existing in physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical forms as, respectively they are human brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experiencible in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, whereby;

(3) the potential to actualize a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, has been conceptually entailed in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences as an aim in, for, and by the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in the reality of change or alteration in the nature of the universe, hence, a complete act of thought, as an aim in, for, and by the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process organically involves a pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, and;

(4) the material of physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical forms of existence inquired into being transformed into subject-matter of inquiry (of the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of reflective thinking experiences aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, existing potentially for actualization) and subject-matter being transformed into an object of inquiry (of the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of reflective thinking experiences aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, existing potentially for actualization), in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, whereby, then;

(5) an object of inquiry is the mediated or transformed, in contrast to the immediate and non-transformed, outcome, consequence, product of the conduct of a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, existing potentially for actualization, i.e. conduct that has been actually completed, in contrast to being not actually completed, in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in the practice of the knowing process, in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe, and;

(6) content of inquiry is what is being propositionally formed, through the sentential composition of meaning, when material is being transformed into subject-matter, and/or subject-matter is being transformed into an object, whereby an object has been formed, in, for, and by reason for referencing and making significant, respectively material and/or subject-matter in, through, and by, the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, existing potentially for actualization, i.e. conduct
that has been actually completed, in contrast to being not actually completed, or being truncated, in the intra-, inter- and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in the practice of the knowing process, in the reality of the union of two general changing (altering) contingent traits (the precarious and stable contingent traits) of becoming as the nature of the universe.

Another function the experiential ontology implicitly performs in Dewey’s naturalistically determined experiential philosophy of pragmatism is to assist in an account of his conception (mind experience) of a naturalistically determined experiential metaphysics, as follows, again stylized in an outlined narrative form of composition by the publisher of cd-IJE by using the extensive use of bold fonting, repetition, and brackets.

Sub-Part 0.2
A Naturalistically Determined Experiential Metaphysics

Existing and Functioning Explicitly in Dewey’s Naturalistically Determined Experiential Philosophy of Pragmatism

From the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, a naturalistically determined experiential ontology exists and functions implicitly formed in Dewey’s explicitly formed naturalistically determined experiential metaphysics. This explicit formation can best be perceived (brain-sensory and psyche experienced) through Dewey’s conception (mind experience) of reality as composed in the context of sententially formed meanings constituting his experiential metaphysics, an introduction to which can be found in The Electronic Version of The Collected Works of John Dewey in Volume 1: 1925, Experience and Nature, Chapter 2; Existence as Precarious and as Stable, as again stylized by the publisher of cd-IJE by using the extensive use of bold fonting, repetition, and brackets, whereby Dewey says:

“Since thinkers claim to be concerned with [immediate] (bold fonting by publisher of cd-IJE) knowledge of existence, rather than with imagination [of existence], they have to make good the pretention to [immediate] knowledge [in contrast to immediate understanding]. Hence they transmute the imaginative perception [the human psyche experienced imagination of a mental image] of the stably good object [stably good outcome of the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the [mediated], knowing [inquiry] process] into a definition and description in contrast with lower and specious [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiations of each of their forms of] existence, [and respectively, their human brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experiences for being philosophically known] which, being precarious and incomplete, alone involves us in the necessity of choice and active struggle [in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the [mediated], knowing (inquiry) process]. Thus they [the definitions and descriptions] remove from actual [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiations of each of their forms of existence, and respectively, their human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences] the very traits which generate philosophic reflection [which generates the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, organically inherent in the philosophic knowing (inquiry) process] and which give point and bearing [which give meaning, reference, and significance] to its [mediated] conclusions [mediated outcomes, consequences, products, warranted assertions, knowledge claims]. In briefest formula, ‘reality’ [that which exists in some higher and non-specious form than that of the lower and specious forms of physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiations of each of their forms of existence, and respectively, their human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual experiences for being philosophically known)] becomes what we wish [what we psyche (perceptually) experience the emotion of the mental feeling of what we wish] existence to be, after we have analyzed its defects and decided upon what would remove them [the defects of the lower and specious physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences]; ‘reality’ is what in [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical forms of lower and specious] existence [and, respectively, their human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences] would be if our [humanly and] reasonably justified preferences [humanly and reasonably justified psyche (perceptual) experiences of the emotion of the mental feelings of preferences] were so completely established in nature [in contrast to being completely established in thought as involved in the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences organically inherent in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process] as to [humanly] exhaust and define its [nature’s] entire being [existence] and thereby render search and struggle unnecessary [render the human psyche (perceptual) experiences of the emotion of the mental feelings of wonder and effort unnecessary]. What is left over, (and since [the psyche (perceptual) experiences of the emotional feelings of] trouble, struggle, conflict, and error still empirically [still experientially] exist,
something is left over) being excluded by [human] definition from full reality [of the higher, non-specious, non-precarious, and completely stable form of existence, it] is assigned to a grade or order of being which is asserted to be metaphysically inferior; an order [experienced] variously [by what is] called appearance, illusion, mortal mind, or the merely empirical [experiential], against what really and truly is [what really and truly exists in a “higher form,” and how that “higher form” of existence is “to be known non-experientially,” in contrast to what exists in physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical “lower” forms of existence, and respectively their human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known]. Then the problem of metaphysics [the problem of the philosophy of reality] alters: instead of being a detection and description of the generic traits of [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical forms of] existence [and respectively, their human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being known], it [metaphysics, i.e. the philosophy of reality] becomes an endeavor [in the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, organically inherent in the practice of the philosophic mediated knowing (inquiry) process] to adjust or reconcile to each other two separate realms of being [two separate realms of existence]. Empirically [experientially] we have just what we started with: the mixture of the precarious and problematic [of the un-stable, lower, and specious] with the assured and complete [with the stable, higher, and non-specious]. But a human classificatory device, based on [human psyche (perceptual) experiences of the emotions of the mental feelings of] desire and elaborated in reflective imagination [elaborated in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, organically inherent in the philosophic mediated knowing (inquiry) process, selectively emphasizing the human psyche (perceptual) experience of imagination of mental images in this conducted practice, and that] has been introduced by which the two traits [the precarious and problematic, i.e. the unstable, lower, and specious, trait of nature and the assured and complete, i.e. the stable, higher, and non-specious, trait of nature] are torn apart, one of them [the assured, complete, stable, higher, and non-specious trait of nature existing as a higher form of existence] being labeled reality and the other [the precarious, incomplete, unstable, lower, and specious trait instantiating the forms of physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known, labeled as] appearance. The genuinely moral problem [the problem of what the moral good is and what the value of the moral good is] of [humanly] mitigating and regulating the troublesome factor [human psyche (perceptual) experience of the emotion of mental feeling of unsettlement or frustration] by active employment of the stable factor then drops out of sight [drops out of the experience of consciousness]. The dialectic problem of logical reconciliation of two notions [the reconciliation of the notion of the stable or non-precarious trait of nature and the notion of the unstable or precarious trait of nature, by selectively focusing on and emphasizing the notion of the stable or non-precarious trait of nature as ‘reality,’ hence the ‘real’ and the ‘good’ trait of nature] has taken its [the moral problem’s] place.” [Page lw.1.52]

Selectively summarized, here, will be that, thusly naturalistically determined, Dewey’s conception is that:

(1) experiential metaphysics is not an endeavor in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, potentially to be actualized in and organically inherent in the practice of the philosophic knowing (inquiry) process, hence not the involvement;

(i) to “adjust or reconcile” to each other;

(ii) the reality of the dis-union of the two separate realms of existence as the nature of the universe i.e:

(ii.i) the precarious and problematic, as the unstable, lower, and specious, Aristotelian conceived (mind experienced) “accidental” realm of the becoming physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiations of each of their forms of existence, and respectively, their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known, as the becoming of the non-formal nature of the universe, and as;

(ii.ii) the assured and complete, as the stable, higher, and non-specious, Aristotelian conceived (mind experienced) “essential” realm of the non-physical, non-physiological, non-mental, non-dispositional, and non-semiosical forms of existence, and respectively, their non-brain-sensory (non-perceptual), non-psyche (non-perceptual), and non-mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known as the Being of the formal nature of the universe, however;

(2) experiential metaphysics is an endeavor, in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, involving a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, potentially to be actualized in and organically inherent in the practice of the philosophic knowing (inquiry) process, hence the involvement of;
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(i) the detection and description of the general contingent traits of becoming as physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiations of each of their forms of existence and respectively, their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known, whereby,

(ii) the general contingent traits of becoming as physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiations of each of their forms of existence, as respectively, brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experienced for being philosophically known;

(iii) not, generally, as the existence of the reality of the dis-union of two separate realms of the Aristotelian conceived (mind experienced) “accidental” non-formal becoming and the Aristotelian conceived (mind experienced) “essential” formal Being as the nature of the universe, but as the existence of the reality of the union of two altering (changing) general contingent traits as the nature of the universe, i.e;

(iv) the existence of the reality of the union, as Dewey designates them, of the “precarious” general contingent trait of the becoming nature of the universe altering (changing) the “stable” general contingent trait of the becoming nature of the universe, and;

(v) the existence of the reality of the union of the “stable” general contingent trait of the becoming nature of the universe altering (changing) the “precarious” general contingent trait of the becoming nature of the universe.

Sub-Sub-Part 0.2.1
Dewey’s Conception (Mind Experience) of the Reality of the Union of the Change or Alteration of Two General Contingent Becoming Traits as the Nature of the Universe in Contrast to Aristotle’s Conception (Mind Experience) of the Reality of the Dis-Union of the Separation of Two Realms, i.e. the Accidental Becoming and Essential Being Realms, as the Nature of the Universe as Composed in and by Their Naturalistically Determined Experiential Metaphysics

From the experiential philosophy of educology perspective, Dewey’s conception of the reality of the union of the change or alteration of the two general contingent traits as the nature of the universe has been composed in his naturalistically determined experiential metaphysics, in which implicitly exists a naturalistically determined experiential ontology, as entailed in what he continues in Chapter 2; Existence as Precarious and as Stable in Experience and Nature, while continuing the stylized extensive use of bold fonting, repetition, and brackets, accounted for where he, Dewey, in the late-Galilean-modern era of science, technology, philosophy, and theology, says about Aristotle, in the pre-Galilean-modern era of science, technology, philosophy, and theology, that he:

“acknowledges contingency, [acknowledges the precarious and problematic (unstable) trait (bold facing of font by publisher of cd-IJE) of the nature of the universe] but he never surrenders his bias in favor of the fixed, certain and finished [assured and complete (stable) realm, in contrast to a trait, of the nature of the universe]. His whole theory of forms and ends [his ontology-metaphysics of the existence of “forms” and “ends” in nature as fixed, final, unchanging, and complete stable realms, in contrast to traits, of the nature of the universe] is a [philosophical] theory of the superiority in Being of rounded-out fixities [as an assured and complete (stable) realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe]. His physics is a fixation of ranks or grades of necessity and contingency [as an two separate realms, in contrast to two altering (changing) traits, as the nature of the universe] so sorted that necessity [the fixed, certain, assured, and complete (stable) realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe] measures dignity and equals degree of reality, while contingency and change or [alteration of the precarious and problematic (unstable) realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe] measures degrees of deficiency of Being. The empirical [experiential scientific] impact and sting [psyche (perceptual) experience of the emotion of the mental feeling of the discomfort of unsetlement] of the mixture of universality [the assured and complete (stable) trait, in contrast to realm, as the nature of the universe] and singularity [the precarious and problematic (unstable) trait, in contrast to realm, as the nature of the universe] and chance is evaded by parceling out the regions of [physical] space so that they [the regions or realms, in contrast to traits] have their natural abode in different [separate] portions of [the] nature [of the universe]. His logic is one of definition and classification, so that its [logic’s] task is completed when changing and contingent things [the precarious and problematic (unstable) realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe] are distinguished [in inductive-deductive-inductively determined reason] from the necessary, universal and fixed [the assured and complete (stable) realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe], by attribution [ascription, assignment] to inferior species of things [by attribution, ascription, or assignment to inferior species, forms, kinds of physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical things, and, respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche, (perceptual), mind (conceptual) experiences]. Chance appears in thought [appears in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences organically inhering in the knowing (inquiry) process] not as a calculus of probabilities in predicting the observable occurrence of any and every [physical, physiological, and mental] event [and, respectively, their brain-sensory (perceptual) and psyche (perceptual) experiences], but as marking an inferior type of syllogism [inferior type of mind (conceptual) experience
of the implication of the semiosical existence of meaning as involved in inductive-deductive-inductive reasoning in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process. Things [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical things] that move [hence, that change or alter] are intrinsically different [separate] from things [as complete Being] that exhibit eternal regularity [hence, that do not change or alter]. Change [or alteration] is honestly recognized as a genuine feature of some things [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical things], but the point of the recognition is avoided by imputing alteration [change] to inherent deficiency of Being ever against complete Being which never changes [never alters]. Changing [altering] things [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical things] belong to a purgatorial [lower] realm, where they wander aimlessly until redeemed by love of finality [absolute stability] of form [finality of complete Being], the acquisition of which lifts them [the changing physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical things] to a paradise of self-sufficient [and absolute complete] Being. With slight exaggeration, it may be said that the thoroughgoing way in which Aristotle defined, distinguished and classified rest [no alteration or change] and movement [alteration or change], the finished [assured and complete (stable) realm, in contrast to trait, of the nature of the universe], and the incomplete [precarious and problematic (unstable) realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe], and potential [precarious and problematic (unstable) realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe], did more to fix tradition, the genteel tradition one is tempted to add, which identifies the fixed and regular [assured and complete (stable) realm, in contrast to trait, of the nature of the universe] with reality of [perfect, complete, and non-changing or non-altering] Being and the changing and hazardous [precarious and problematic (unstable) trait as the nature of the universe] with [non-perfect, non-complete, and changing or altering] deficiency of Being than ever was accomplished by those who took the shorter path of asserting that change [alteration] is illusory [as psyche (perceptual) experienced as the imagination of a mental image that does not represent or correspond with something that exists in the reality of the realm of the fixed and final, hence that always exists and never changes.]

His philosophy was closer to empirical [experiential scientific] facts [i.e. closer to physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical facts, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences] than most modern philosophies, in that it was neither monistic nor dualistic but openly pluralistic. His plurals [his physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiated forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for philosophical knowing] fall however, within a grammatical system [within the system that conceived (mind experienced the semiosical existence of meanings of words and sentences such that a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, is what is immediately concluded in sententially formed meanings, rather than a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, being what is intra-, inter, and trans-actively conducted to a mediated conclusion in the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences organically inherent in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process, as guided by sententially formed meanings, i.e. by sentences], to each portion [in the grammatical system] of which a corresponding cosmic status [as what physically, physiologically, mentally, dispositionally, semiosically exists in forms and what, respectively, in particular is brain-sensory (perceptually), psyche (perceptually, and mind (conceptually) experienced for being philosophically known is allotted. Thus his pluralism [his doctrine about the physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiated forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known] solved the problem of how to have your cake and eat it too, for a classified and ordered set of pluralities, of variants, of particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiated forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known] has none of the sting of [none of the psyche (perceptual) experience of the emotion of the mental feelings of the discomfort of emotional unsettlement induced by] the miscellaneous and uncoordinated plurals [of particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiated forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences for being philosophically known] of our actual world. In this classificatory scheme of separation [of two realms, in contrast to two traits, as the nature of the universe] he has been followed, though perhaps unwittingly, by many philosophers of different import. Thus Kant [in the mid-modern era of science, technology, philosophy, and theology] assigns all that is manifold and chaotic [all that exists that in particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical particular instantiated forms of existence, and respectively their human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences to be philosophically known] to one realm, that of sense [that of human brain-sensory and of human psyche experiences, hence of human perceptions], and all that is uniform and regular to that of reason [to that of human mind experience, hence of human conception]. A single and all-embracing dialectic problem of the combination of sense [brain-sensory (perceptual) and psyche (perceptual) experiences of a changing or altering realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe] and thought [mind (conceptual) experience of a non-changing or non-altering realm, in contrast to trait, as the nature of the universe] is thereby substituted for the concrete problems that arise [that are psyche (perceptually) experienced by the emotion of the
mental feeling of the discomfort of unsettlement] through the mixed and varied [real] union in existence of the variable [the changing or altering] and the constant, the necessary [the non-changing or non-altering] and that which proceeds uncertainly [i.e. that which proceeds with the psyche (perceptual) experience of the mental feeling of unsettlement in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process]” [Page lw.1.48-1.49]

In this quote, Dewey:

(1) is implying that;

(i) Aristotle’s naturalistic metaphysics, i.e. Aristotle’s philosophy of the existence of the reality of the dis-union of the two separate realms of accidental non-formal becoming and essential formal Being as the nature of the universe, compares and contrasts with;

(ii) his (Dewey’s) naturalistic metaphysics, i.e. his (Dewey’s) philosophy of the existence of the reality of the union of the two altering (changing) general contingent traits of becoming as the nature of the universe;

(2) is implying that Aristotle’s naturalistic metaphysics has had, and continues to have, epistemologically determined harmful consequences in and on human mind (conceptual) experiences on earth by continuing the traditional conception of reality as the dis-union of two separate realms, i.e;

(i) one realm existing higher than and superior to the other, hence existing as a completely and totally stable essential Being, therefore existing as a completely and totally non-changing realm, and;

(ii) one realm existing lower than and inferior to the other, hence existing as a non-completely and non-totally stable accidental becoming, therefore existing as a completely and totally changing realm;

(iii) as the nature of the universe;

(3) is implying that his (Dewey’s) naturalistic metaphysics could, and would have, epistemologically determined helpful consequences in and on human mind (conceptual) experiences on earth by reconstructing the traditional conception of reality as the dis-union of two separate realms, whereas one realm is not changing and the other realm is changing, by contemporarily conceiving reality as the union of two altering (changing) general contingent traits, i.e;

(i) one trait existing as a stable, but not a completely stable general contingent trait, hence existing as a changing trait of becoming, and;

(ii) one trait existing as a precarious, but not a completely precarious general contingent trait, hence existing as a changing trait of becoming, whereas;

(iii) neither general contingent trait of becoming is a superior or inferior general contingent trait of becoming;

(iv) as the nature of the universe;

(4) is implying that there is a difference between what is designated as a complete act of thought, i.e. a difference between what a complete act of thought is, or. i.e. a difference, from the experiential science of semiotics perspective, between what is referred to and made significant, hence what is represented, by the meaning of the locution ‘complete act of thought’, in Aristotle’s and Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics, whereas;

(i) in Aristotle’s pre-Galilean-modern naturalistic metaphysics, from the experiential science of semiotics perspective;

   (i.i) the meaning of the locution ‘complete act of thought’;

   (i.ii) refers to and makes significant what;

   (i.ii.i) in, through, and by the completion of the form of a declarative sentence;

   (i.ii.ii) as completed with grammatically and immediately mind apprehended knowledge, in contrast to grammatically and immediately mind (conceptually) apprehended understanding, of the relation of a subject to its predicate in a declarative sentence, as this relation;

   (i.iii) is directly (non-mediatively, immediately, non-transformatively, certainly) formed to exist as propositional content, i.e. what is completely sententiously composed by meanings to make a declarative
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statement as a non-transitional feature asserted as a completely formed act of thought, as a final end, in contrast to an end-in-view;

(i.v) in the reality of the dis-union of the separation of a higher, complete, non-changing, essential realm of Being from a lower, incomplete, and changing accidental realm of becoming, as the nature of the universe, and;

(ii) in Dewey’s late-Galilean-modern naturalistic metaphysics, from the experiential science of semiotics perspective;

(ii.i) the meaning of the locution ‘complete act of thought’;

(ii.ii) refers to and makes significant what;

(ii.ii.i) in, through, and by the completion of the intra-, inter, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of the reflective thinking experience;

(ii.ii.ii) as involving a grammatically and immediately mind (conceptually) apprehended understanding, in contrast to grammatically and immediately mind (conceptually) apprehended knowing, of the relation of the subject to its predicate in a declarative sentence;

(ii.ii.iii) as such immediate understanding, i.e. the apprehension, by mind experiences are transitionally involved in a grammatically and meditatively mind comprehended understanding, in contrast to knowing, of the relation of a subject to its predicate in a declarative sentence, as it;

(ii.ii.iii) is indirectly (meditatively, non-immediately, transformatively, non-certainly) transformed to exist as propositional content, i.e. what is completely sententially composed by meanings to make declarative statements as assertions of transitional features of material, subject-matter, objects, and propositional content, asserted as a completely patterned act of thought, as an end-in-view, contrast to a final end;

(ii.iv) in, through, and by reason, in the pattern of phases in the conduct of reflective acts, involved in the process of indirectly (meditatively, non-immediately, transformatively, non-certainly) knowing, in contrast to understanding, by truly referring to and making significant, i.e. by truly representing, through the specificity of specification and designation, two general altering (changing) traits of becoming;

(ii.v) in the reality of the union of the alteration of a stable but changing general contingent trait of becoming, and a precarious and changing general contingent trait of becoming, as the nature of the universe, and;

(5) is implying that there is a difference between Dewey (in the late-Galilean-modern era of science, technology, and philosophy, and of theology) and Kant (in the mid-Galilean-modern era of science, technology, and philosophy, and of theology), as it is entailed by the difference between Aristotle’s and Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics (respectively in the pre-Galilean-modern and late-Galilean-modern eras of science, technology, philosophy, and theology), in what the meaning of the term ‘pluralism’ refers to and makes significant, as accounted for in the re-quote from the above quote, where Dewey says;

(i) “Thus, his [Aristotle’s] pluralism [his doctrine about the particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experiences] solved the problem of how to have your cake and eat it too, for a classified and ordered set of pluralities, of variants, [of particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences] has none of the sting of [none of the psyche (perceptual) experience of the emotion of the mental feelings of the discomfort of emotional unsettlement induced by] the miscellaneous and uncoordinated plurals [of particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences] of our actual world. In this classificatory scheme of separation of two realms, in contrast to two traits, of the nature of the universe he has been followed, though perhaps unwittingly, by many philosophers of different import. Thus Kant assigns all that is manifold and chaotic [all that exists that in particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their human brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences] to one realm, that of sense [that of human brain-sensory and of human psyche experiences, hence of human perceptions], and all that is uniform and regular [i.e. the forms of the particular existences] to that of reason [to that of human mind experience, hence of human conception]. A single and all-embracing dialectic problem of the combination of sense [brain-sensory (perceptual) and psyche (perceptual) experiences of a changing or altering realm, in contrast to trait, of the nature of the universe] and thought [mind (conceptual) experience of a non-changing or non-altering realm, in contrast to
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trait, of the nature of the universe] is thereby substituted for the concrete problems that arise [that are psyche (perceptually) experienced by the emotion of the mental feeling of the discomfort of unsetlement] through the mixed and varied [real] union in existence of the variable [the changing or altering] and the constant, the necessary [the non-changing or non-altering] and that which proceeds uncertainly [i.e. that which proceeds with the psyche (perceptual) experience of the mental feeling of unsetlement in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process]; whereas, it follows that;

(ii) Dewey has, but Kant has none of the sting of [Dewey has, but Kant has none of the psyche (perceptual) experience of the emotion of the mental feelings of the reaction of the ‘sting’ of the discomfort of emotional unsetlement induced, through being excited, by the miscellaneous and uncoordinated plurals [of particular physical, physiological, and mental instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual) and psyche (perceptual) experiences] of our actual world,” which in respect to Aristotle’s naturalistic metaphysics of reality;

(iii) Dewey does not assign, but Kant does assign “all that is manifold and chaotic [all that exists in particular physical, physiological, and mental instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their human brain-sensory (perceptual) and psyche (perceptual) experiences] to one realm, that of sense [that of human brain-sensory and of human psyche experiences, hence of human perceptions], and all that is uniform and regular [i.e. forms of particular existences] to that of reason [to that of human mind experience, hence of human conception],” therefore;

(iii.i) in respect to a “dialectic problem” aimed at a complete act of thought as practiced in an immediate, non-transformative knowing of or about something, involving a syllogistically determined inductive-deductive-inductive experiential epistemology, as conceived (mind experienced) from the perspective of Aristotle’s naturalistic metaphysics of the dis-unionization of reality as the dis-union of two separate realms, one as a changing accidental non-formal realm of becoming, and the other as a non-changing formal essential realm of Being as the nature of the universe, but:

(iii.ii) in dis-respect to “concrete problems” aimed at complete acts of thought as practiced in a mediated, transformative knowing of or about something, involving a non-syllogistically determined inductive-abductive-deductive, abductive-inductive experiential epistemology, as conceived (mind experienced) from the perspective of Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics of the unionization of reality as the union of two general contingent traits, one as a stable but still changing general contingent trait of being and the other as a precarious and changing general contingent trait of becoming as the nature of the universe, as quoted again, where;

(iv) “A single and all-embracing dialectic problem of the combination of sense [brain-sensory and psyche experiences of a changing or altering accidental realm, in contrast to general contingent trait, of the nature of the universe] and thought [mind experience of a non-changing or non-altering essential realm, in contrast to general contingent trait, of the nature of the universe] is thereby substituted for the concrete problems that arise [that are psyche (perceptually) experienced by the emotion of the mental feeling of the discomfort of unsetlement] through the mixed and varied [real] union in existence of the variable [and general contingent trait of the becoming nature of the universe] and the constant [but general contingent trait of the becoming nature of the universe] and that which proceeds uncertainly [i.e. that which proceeds with the psyche (perceptual) experience of the mental feeling of unsetlement in the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process involved in the becoming nature of the universe].”

Entailed by the quote are two versions of astronomy and cosmology, i.e. two versions of what will now be referenced and made significant, hence to be represented, by the meaning of the term ‘astro-cosmo-physics’, i.e. as experiential scientific knowledge claims as propositionally formed content being sententially composed by meanings referencing and making significant the physical structure and function (the natural material of astronomy) and the physical origin and future (the natural material of cosmology) of the universe.

Sub-Sub-Part 0.2.2

Aristotle’s Pre-Galilean-Modern-Era and Dewey’s Late-Galilean-Modern-Era of Astro-Cosmo-Physics as Experiential Physical Scientific Groundings for Their Experiential Metaphysics from a Naturalistically Determined Experiential Ontological Perspective

The astro-cosmo-physics of the naturalistically determined experiential metaphysics of Aristotle’s dis-unioned reality, and of Dewey’s unioned reality contrast in that the knowledge claims as propositionally formed content being sententially composed in meanings made in astronomy (in astro-physics as an experiential physical science) and cosmology (in cosmo-physics as an experiential physical science), in Aristotle’s time was during the “pre-Galilean-modern-era of science, technology, philosophy, and theology,” (from Aristotle to Copernicus) and in
Dewey’s time was during the “late-Galilean-modern-era of science, technology, philosophy, and theology,” (from Galileo to Dewey).

The astronomy (the experiential physical science of astro-physics) and cosmology (the experiential physical science of cosmo-physics) of:

1. Aristotle’s pre-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics involved scientifically determined experiential knowledge claims as propositionally formed in sententially composed meanings referencing and making significant;
   (i) the earth physically existing, hence from the naturalistically determined experiential ontological perspective;
      (i.i) being human brain-sensory experiencable (perceivable) by sensception, specifically by the exterio-ceptor nerve cells organically inhering in the human eyes’ sensceptual (perceptual) experience of the physical existence of the exceptionally large, and organically;
      (i.ii) being human mind experiencable (conceivable), by implication of the semiosical existence of meaning constituting, instituting, and organically inhering in, the human mind’s conceptual experience of the semiosical existence of sententionally composed meaning forming propositional content used in reason to reference and make significant, hence to represent, the physical existence of the exceptionally large;
   (ii) as the “center” of a “geo-centered-planetary-naturalized-system” in the universe, whereas, in contrast;

2. Dewey’s late-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics involved scientifically determined experiential knowledge claims as propositionally formed in sententially composed meanings referencing and making significant;
   (i) the sun physically existing, hence from the naturalistically determined experiential ontological perspective;
      (i.i) being human brain-sensory experiencable (perceivable) by sensception, specifically by the exterio-ceptor nerve cells organically inhering in the human eyes’ sensceptual (perceptual) experience of the physical existence of the exceptionally large, and organically;
      (i.ii) being human mind experiencable (conceivable), by implication of the semiosical existence of meaning constituting, instituting, and organically inhering in, the human mind’s conceptual experience of the semiosical existence of sententionally composed meaning forming propositional content used in reason to reference and make significant, hence to represent, the physical existence of the exceptionally large;
   (ii) as the “center” of a “helio-centered-planetary-naturalized-system” in the universe.

From the experiential ontological perspective, selectively emphasizing the human brain-sensory eye determined sensceptual (hence, human brain-sensory perceptual) experience of exceptionally large physical existence, being organically conditioned by human mind (hence, human mind conceptual) experiences of the semiosical existence of sententionally composed meaning forming propositional content used in reason, then:

1. Aristotle’s experiential metaphysics (Aristotle’s philosophy of the reality of the dis-union of two separate realms of accidental non-formal becoming and essential formal Being as the nature of the universe) was grounded on, in, and by a pre-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics as an experiential physical science involving;
   (i) a non-telescopically aided human brain-sensory eye determined sensceptual (hence, perceptual) experience of the physical existence of the exceptionally large, i.e. of the physical existence of a geo-centered-planetary-naturalized-system in the universe, organically conditioned by;
   (ii) a syllogistically determined experiential epistemology, hence, inductively-deductively-inductively determined human mind (hence, conceptual) experiences of the semiosical existence of sententionally composed meaning forming propositional content used in reason for referencing and making significant the exceptionally large geo-centered-planetary-naturalized-system in the universe, as involved in the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process, and;

2. Dewey’s experiential metaphysics (Dewey’s philosophy of reality of two altering, i.e. two changing, general contingent traits of becoming as the nature of the universe) was grounded on, in, and by a late-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics as an experiential physical science involving;
   (i) an earth-based-telescopically aided human brain-sensory eye determined sensceptual (hence, perceptual) experience of the physical existence of the exceptionally large, i.e. of the physical existence of a helio-centered-planetary-naturalized-
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system in the universe, and organically conditioned by;

(ii) a non-syllogistically determined experiential epistemology, hence, an inductively-abductively-deductively-abductively-deductively-inductively determined human mind (hence, conceptual) experiences of the semiosical existence of sententionally composed meaning forming propositional content used in reason for referencing and making significant the exceptionally large helio-centered-planetary-naturalized-system in the universe, as involved in the conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, organically inhering in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process.

From the experiential ontological perspective, as founded in Dewey’s experiential philosophy of pragmatism, involving the transitional features of material, subject-matter, object, and content, then, Aristotle’s metaphysics of the dis-unionization of reality and Dewey’s metaphysics of the unionization of reality are grounded, generally, in the physical science of physics, hence involving:

(1) human brain-sensory eye determined sensceptual (hence, perceptual) experiences of that which is inquired into existing and functioning as the transitional feature of the material of an exceptionally large kind of physical existence, i.e. the transitional feature of the material of the physical universe and its structure, function, origin, and future, and organically conditioned by;

(2) human mind (hence, conceptual) experiences of the transitional feature of the material, as that which is inquired into, for constructing the transitional feature of subject-matter in sententionally composed meanings forming propositional content as the transitional material used in;

(i) a non-telescopically aided syllogistically determined experiential epistemology, hence an inductively-deductively-inductively determined mind (conceptual) experience of reason by Aristotle, and;

(ii) an earth-based telescopically aided non-syllogistically determined experiential epistemology, hence an inductively-abductively-deductively-abductively-deductively-inductively determined mind (conceptual) experience of reason by Dewey;

(3) for referencing and making significant, hence for representing, the transitional feature of an object as an exceptionally large kind of physical existence, i.e. the existence of the physical universe and its structure, function, origin, and future, as a transitionally featured object existing and functioning;

(i) in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in which organically inheres;

(ii) the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought;

(iii) by Dewey, in the late-Galilean-modern-era of science, technology, philosophy, and theology, as to a naturalized determined experiential metaphysics of the nature of reality existing as the union of the two altering general traits, i.e;

(iii.i) the existence of a precarious, non-perfect, non-complete, non-secure, and changing general contingent trait of becoming, unioned with;

(iii.ii) the existence of a stable, non-perfect, non-complete, fairly-secure, but changing general contingent trait of becoming;

(iii.iii) as the nature of the universe, and;

(iv) by Aristotle, in the pre-Galilean-modern-era of science, technology, philosophy, and theology, as to a naturalized determined experiential metaphysics of the nature of reality existing as the dis-union of the two separate realms, i.e.

(iv.i) the existence of a non-perfect, non-complete, non-secure, and changing accidental realm of becoming, dis-unioned from;

(iv.ii) the existence of a perfect, complete, absolutely-secure, and non-changing essential realm of Being;

(iv.iii) as the nature of the universe.

In summary, then from a naturalistically determined experiential ontological perspective, the critical difference between Aristotle’s and Dewey’s experiential metaphysics, respectively of:

(1) the existence of the dis-union of;
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(i) an accidental non-formal realm of becoming as physical, physiological, mental, semiosical, and dispositional particular instantiations of their forms of existence, respectively experienced by sensory, psyche, and mind experiences, separated from;

(ii) an essential formal realm of Being as constituted by non-physical, non-physiological, non-mental, non-semiosical, and non-dispositional forms of existence, respectively, then not experienced by sensory, psyche, and mind experiences as the;

(iii) real nature of the universe, and;

(2) the existence of the union of;

(i) a general contingent precarious trait of becoming as physical, physiological, mental, semiosical, and dispositional particular existents, respectively experienced by sensory, psyche, and mind experiences, with a;

(ii) a general contingent stable trait of becoming as physical, physiological, mental, semiosical, and dispositional particular existents, respectively experienced by sensory, psyche, and mind experiences, as the;

(iii) real nature of the universe;

is that of:

(1) Aristotle’s pre-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics as an experiential physical science, and;

(2) Dewey’s late-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics as an experiential physical science.

The point of significance, from this summary, is that Aristotle’s pre-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics, as experiential physical scientific grounding for his (Aristotle’s) experiential metaphysics:

(1) as it involved an inductively-deductively-inductively, in contrast to an inductively-abductively-deductively-abductively-deductively-inductively mind (conceptually) determined experiential epistemological perspective as to what experiential physical scientific knowledge is, and as alluded to earlier;

(2) as it solved the problem of how to have your cake and eat it too;

(3) through the practice of using a classified and ordered set of pluralities, of variants, [of particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory (perceptual), psyche (perceptual), and mind (conceptual) experiences];

(4) it, i.e. Aristotle’s pre-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics, as experiential physical science;

(5) of the physical existence of the exceptionally large, i.e. of the physical universe

(i) had none of the sting of [none of the psyche experience of the emotion of the mental feelings of the discomfort of emotional unsettlement induced by];

(ii) the miscellaneous and uncoordinated plurals [of particular physical, physiological, mental, dispositional, and semiosical instantiations of the forms of existence, and respectively their brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experiences];

(iii) of our actual world.

The critical difference between Aristotle’s and Dewey’ experiential metaphysics, as determined by the difference between:

(1) Aristotle’s pre-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics conception of the experiential physical science of the exceptionally large physical existence of the universe, and;

(2) Dewey’s late-Galilean-modern-era-astro-cosmo-physics conception of the experiential physical science of the exceptionally large physical existence of the universe;

is that Dewey’s conception of the experiential physical science of the exceptionally large physical existence of the universe reconstructs epistemology, as philosophy of what knowledge is, such that, as alluded to earlier,
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(3) the epistemologically determined harmful consequences in and on human mind (conceptual) experiences on earth, as continued by the traditional conception, entailed by Aristotle’s experiential metaphysics, of the dis-union of two separate realms of nature as reality in the universe, is;

(4) changed to have epistemologically determined helpful consequences in and on human mind (conceptual) experiences on earth by contemporarily conceiving, in Dewey’s experiential metaphysics, of the union of two altering (changing) general contingent traits of nature as reality in the universe, and whereby;

this reconstructed change in and of epistemology, as philosophy of what knowledge is, is best conceived (mind experienced) as the difference between what the meaning of the locution ‘complete act of thought’ refers to and makes significant:

(5) in Aristotle’s experiential logic, and;

(6) in Dewey’s experiential logic.

Sub-Sub-Part 0.2.3
Aristotle’s Experiential Logic and Dewey’s Experiential Logic as They Compare and Contrast as to Their Conceptions (Mind Experiences) of What a Complete Act of Thought Epistemologically Involves and Does Not Involve from the Perspective of a Grammatically Informed Common Sense Experience

within the semiosical existence of a context of meaning;

(7) formed in a grammatical system of;

(8) rules for composing sentential meaning;

used in reasoning;

(9) syllogistically in an Aristotelian determined inductive-deductive-inductive experiential epistemology, and;

(10) non-syllogistically, in a Deweyan determined inductive-abductive-deductive-abductive-inductive experiential epistemology, in:

(9) the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences organically inherent in;

(10) the practice of the knowing process;

(11) from the perspective of Dewey’s experiential metaphysics;

(12) within the union of two altering (changing) general contingent traits of nature as reality in the universe.

Complete act of thought thought experiment

Copernicus’ four years at Kraków played an important role in the development of his critical faculties and initiated his analysis of the logical contradictions in the two “official” systems of astronomy—Aristotle’s theory of homocentric spheres, and Ptolemy’s mechanism of eccentrics and epicycles—the surmounting and discarding of which constituted the first step toward the creation of Copernicus’ own doctrine of the structure of the universe. 152
the physical existence of moderately large earth-based telescopes:

(1) as developed by Galileo from Lippershey’s and other’s designs, originally designated as the Galileo Telescope;

(2) as later, in the early-Galilean-modern-era of astro-cosmo-physics, enhanced by Kepler, Newton, and others, and;

(3) as much later, in the post-Galilean-modern era of astro-cosmo-physics extended into the physical existence of a moderately large space-based telescope, designated as the Hubble Space Telescope (HST);

(4) soon to be extended, in the post-Galilean-modern era of astro-cosmo-physics, into the space-based telescope designated as the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), whereas;

(5) both earth- and space-based telescopes;

(6) are moderately large physically oriented technical aids (are physically oriented technologies;

(7)) for assisting sensory experiences of physical existence;

(i) organically involving the mind experiences of the;

   (i.i) semiosical existence of a context of sententially formed meanings;

   (i.ii) i.e. the context of propositional content, as a transitional feature;

(ii) transformed from the transitional features of;

   (ii.i) material and subject-matter;

   (ii.ii) organically inhering in the

      (ii.iii) intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought;

(iii) in the knowing (inquiry) process;

   (iii.i) practiced in the experiential physical sciences of astronomy and cosmology;

   (iii.ii) using, specifically, the sensceptual experiences, organically involving the exterior-ceptors in the eyes, in contrast to the ears, nose, skin, or tongue, of human, personal, or individual selves;

   (iii.iii) of the exceptionally large physical universe and its structure, function, origin, and future.

Sub-Sub-Sub-Part 0.2.3.1

The Representative Functions of the Semiotic Distinction between Symbol-Meaning and Sign-Significance from a Naturalistically Determined Experiential Ontological Perspective

Implicit in the above has been what will be designated as the “representative functions” of the Semiotic distinction between symbol-meaning and sign-significance, about which in the Electronic Edition, Volume 12, 1938, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry The Existential Matrix of Inquiry: Cultural, stylized by continuing the extensive use of bold fonting, repetition, and brackets, Dewey says that:

“I shall, accordingly, in what follows, connect sign and significance, symbol and meaning, respectively, with each
other, in order to have terms (bold fonting by publisher of cd-IJE) to designate two different kinds of representative capacity. Linguistically [semiotically], the choice of terms is more or less arbitrary, although sign and significance have a common verbal root. This consideration is of no importance, however, compared with the necessity of having some words by which to designate the two kinds of representative function. For purposes of [semiotic] theory the important consideration is that [physical, physiological, and mental events as] existent things, [functioning] as signs, are evidence of the existence of something else [as the existence of the something else of other physical, physiological, and mental forms of existence], this something being [the disposition of other physical, physiological, and mental forms of existence] at the time [mind (conceptually) experienced by being] inferred rather than [respectively, by being brain-sensory, or psyche experientially] observed [perceived].

But words, or symbols [as symbol-meanings in their semiosical existence as mind (conceptually) experienced by the implication of meaning] provide no evidence of any [physical, physiological, mental, or dispositional] existence, respectively as brain-sensory or psyche experienced, or mind experienced by inference]. Yet what they lack in this capacity they make up for in creation of another dimension. They [symbol-meanings in their semiosical existence as mind experienced by the implication of meaning] make possible ordered [coherent] discourse [sententially composed meaning] or reasoning. For this may be carried on without any of the [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional] existences [and, respectively their brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experiences] to which symbols [as symbol-meanings in their semiosical existence as mind experienced by implication of meaning] apply being actually present: without, indeed, assurance that [physical, physiological, mental, dispositional] objects [respectively, as brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experienced] to which they [the symbol-meanings in their semiosical existence being mind experienced by implication of meaning] apply anywhere actually exist, and, as in the case of mathematical discourse, without direct reference to [physical, physiological, mental, or dispositional] existence at all.” [Page lw.12.58]

Sub-Sub-Sub-Part 0.2.3.1
The Semiotical Distinctions between Meaning, Reference, and Signification as they are Associated with Relations from a Naturalistically Determined Experiential Ontological Perspective

A critical semiotical distinction being used above is that between meaning, reference, and signification as made by Dewey in The Electronic Version; The Collected Works of John Dewey; Volume 12; Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Part One: Introduction: The Matrix of Inquiry; The Existential Matrix of Inquiry: Cultural, still continuing the extensive use of bold fonting, repetition, and brackets, where he says that:

“The discussion has now reached a point where it is necessary to deal with the ambiguity of the [symbol-meaning of the] word ‘[relation]’ (bold fonting by publisher of cd-IJE) as it is used not merely in ordinary speech but in logical [semiotic] texts. The [meaning of the] word ‘relation’ is used to cover three very different matters [of meanings] which in the interest of a [symbol-meaning] coherent logical [semiotic] doctrine must be discriminated. [In, by, and through the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in the reality of the union of the altering of a stable but changing general trait of becoming, and a precarious and changing general trait of becoming, as the nature of the universe] (1) symbols [symbol-meanings as mind experienced by implication] are ‘related’ directly to one another; (2) they are “related” to [physical, physiological, mental, and dispositional] existence [respectively, as brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experienced] by the mediating [hence, transformative] intervention of existent operations [in, by, and through the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in the reality of the union of the altering of a stable but changing general trait of becoming, and a precarious and changing general trait of becoming, as the nature of the universe]; (3) [physical, physiological, mental, and dispositional] existences [and, respectively, their brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experiences] are ‘related’ to one another in the [physical, physiological, mental, and dispositional] evidential sign-signified function. That these three modes of ‘relation’ are different from one another and that the use of one and the same word tends to cover up the difference and thereby create doctrinal confusion is evident. [Page lw.12.61]

[In, by, and through the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in the reality of the union of the altering of a stable but changing general trait of becoming, and a precarious and changing general trait of becoming, as the nature of the universe] in order to avoid, negatively, the disastrous doctrinal confusion that arises from [is induced by] the ambiguity of the [meaning of the] word relation, and in order to possess, positively, linguistic [semiotic] means of making clear the logical [semiotic] nature of the different subject-matters [as that which being inquired with] under discussion, I shall reserve the word relation to designate the kind of ‘relation’ which symbol-meanings [and their being mind experienced by implication] bear to one another as symbol-meanings [and their being mind experienced by implication]. I shall use the term
reference to designate the kind of relation they [the symbol-meanings and their being mind experienced by implication] sustain to [physical, physiological, mental, and dispositional] existence [and, respectively their being brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experienced]; and the words connection (and involvement) to designate that kind of relation sustained by [physical, physiological, mental, and dispositional] things [and, respectively, their being brain-sensory, psyche, and mind experienced] to one another in virtue of which [the mind experience of] inference is possible. [Page lw.12.61]

[In, by, and through the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in the reality of the union of the altering of a stable but changing general trait of becoming, and a precarious and changing general trait of becoming, as the nature of the universe] the differences, when once pointed out, should be so obvious as hardly to require illustration. Consider, however, propositions of mathematical physics. (1) As propositions they form a system of related symbol-meanings [as being mind experienced by the implication of meaning] that may be considered and developed as such. (2) But as propositions of physics, not of mere mathematics, they have reference to [physical] existence; a reference which is realized in operations of application [in, by, and through the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in the reality of the union of the altering of a stable but changing general trait of becoming, and a precarious and changing general trait of becoming, as the nature of the universe. (3) The final test of valid reference or applicability [of the semiosical existence of symbol-meaning as mind (conceptually experienced by implication) resides in the connections that exist among [physical] things [and their being brain-sensory experienced by sensception]. Existential involvement of [physical] things [and their being brain-sensory experienced by sensception] with one another alone warrants [the mind experience of] inference so as to enable further connections among [physical] things [and their being brain-sensory experienced by sensception] themselves to be discovered [in, by, and through the intra-, inter-, and trans-active conduct of the pattern of phases of reflective thinking experiences, aimed at a complete act of thought, in contrast to an incomplete or truncated act of thought, in the practice of the knowing (inquiry) process in the reality of the union of the altering of a stable but changing general trait of becoming, and a precarious and changing general trait of becoming, as the nature of the universe]. [Page lw.12.61]"

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Part 1: Purpose, Invitation, Hope, Need, Assumption, and the Fact of Educological Ignorance

Part 1.1 The Experientially Determined Sociological Fact of Ignorance about How to Reduce Waste in the Practice of an Experientially Determined Educational Process

Part 1.2 The Experientially Determined Educological Fact of Ignorance about How to Reduce Waste in the Practice of an Experientially Determined Educational Process

Part 2 Beginning the Removal of the Experiential Educological Fact of Ignorance about How to Reduce Waste in the General Practice of an Experientially Determined Educational Process in School Education Institutions in USA’s Developing Democracy, as Well as Others, in the World:

Involving an Experiential Philosophy of Educology Naturalistically Determined by an Experiential Ontology and Epistemology